

1996

Security and Rational Choice: Household, Community, and Public Provision.

John Collins Kilburn Jr

Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses

Recommended Citation

Kilburn, John Collins Jr, "Security and Rational Choice: Household, Community, and Public Provision." (1996). *LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses*. 6259.

https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses/6259

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact gradetd@lsu.edu.

INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

UMI

A Bell & Howell Information Company
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor MI 48106-1346 USA
313/761-4700 800/521-0600

SECURITY AND RATIONAL CHOICE:
HOUSEHOLD, COMMUNITY, AND PUBLIC PROVISION

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of Sociology

by

John C. Kilburn Jr.

B.A., University of New Orleans, 1987

M.A., Louisiana State University, 1992

August 1996

UMI Number: 9706342

UMI Microform 9706342
Copyright 1996, by UMI Company. All rights reserved.

**This microform edition is protected against unauthorized
copying under Title 17, United States Code.**

UMI
300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, MI 48103

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I have many people to thank for various types of assistance and support throughout the dissertation process. I will always value the friendships I have made with the faculty, staff, and fellow graduate students at Louisiana State University. I thank Joachim Singelmann for steady guidance as Chair of the sociology department. Several faculty members have contributed greatly to this work and my professional development though not formally serving on my dissertation committee. In particular, Jack Beggs, Scott Feld, and Jill Suitor offered friendship, guidance, and help far exceeding their job descriptions. Administrative Assistants Wanda Ashley, Donna Elisar, and Colleen Meechum have helped me countless times. Their combination of competence and compassion has helped me navigate through numerous administrative procedures. I would like to single out Craig Carter, Kuo-Hua Chen, Mary Gautier, Mike Maume, Carson Mencken, and Graham Ousey. They served as friends and teachers to me throughout my graduate career.

My friends outside of the Sociology Department, Dwayne Beason, Al Derbes, George Eckert, David Rombach, John Scheyd, and the Monday Night Vets group offered continued encouragement and helped me discover the difference between important and unimportant things.

I selected my dissertation committee from a list of people I admire. My admiration and respect has grown for each member throughout this process. First, I would like to thank my outside member, Chad Ellett. He was supportive and insightful in directing me to a new understanding of the concept of trust. Ed Shihadeh introduced me to several key concepts in criminological research that fascinate me and should guide my research for years to come. Charlie Tolbert introduced me to the work of Robert Putnam and enabled me to think about the study of social capital in a new way. Jeanne Hurlbert spent countless hours scouring several drafts and provided several important critiques of the dissertation. Each time I gave her a draft of the dissertation, I had faith that a better product would be returned to me.

Most of my interest in sociology can be attributed to my committee chair, Wes Shrum. His intellectual enthusiasm is contagious. In my years of working with him, I came to believe that the profession of sociology can be one of the most rewarding and interesting jobs in the world. He has given countless hours of his time to help my professional development. Beyond his tremendous work effort on this dissertation, his unwavering support was the greatest gift I received from him. I am enthusiastic about our current and future collaborative projects.

I thank my parents, John and Barbara Kilburn, and sister, Joan Kilburn for support and encouragement. Because I have always believed that they offer unconditional love, I am able to take risks in life with little fear of failure. I thank the Jesuits for aiding in my personal development. In my years at Jesuit High School, I developed an interest in community service. Whenever I follow that path, I have found great rewards. I would like to acknowledge Professors Rose Daigle and Jenny Phillips. They introduced me to the concepts of sociology in my undergraduate years and encouraged my pursuit of more knowledge.

I would like to give the most special thanks to my best friend and wife, Judith Delmas. She has constantly been supportive and loving. With her, I enthusiastically await the birth of our first child.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	ii
LIST OF TABLES	vii
ABSTRACT	x
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION	1
The Problem	1
Levels of Security	4
Micro-Level Security	6
Meso- and Macro-Level Security	7
The Free Rider Problem	9
Approaches to Understanding Security	12
The Psychological Approach	12
Criticism of the Psychological Approach	14
The Stratification Approach	15
Criticism of the Stratification Approach	17
The Social Network Approach	17
Criticism of the Social Network Approach	21
The Rational Choice Approach	22
Summary	28
CHAPTER 2. SECURITY-RELATED HYPOTHESES	33
Introduction	33
Household, Community, and Municipal Level Hypotheses	34
Psychological Hypotheses	37
Stratification Hypotheses	42
Social Network Hypotheses	47
Rational Choice Hypotheses	51
Data and Variable Description	55
Data	55
Dependent Variables	60
Independent Variables	63
CHAPTER 3. ANALYSIS	68
Introduction	68
Sample Characteristics	68
Attitudes on Fear and Violence	74
Descriptive Statistics	83
Analysis	86
Levels of Security	86

Psychological	93
Stratification	97
Social Networks	107
Rational Choice	109
Discussion	116
CHAPTER 4. CONCLUSION	118
Introduction	118
Review of Results	120
Psychological Approach	120
Stratification Approach	120
Social Network Approach	122
Rational Choice Approach	123
Theoretical Implications	128
Limitations of the Study	130
Implications for Professional Practice	133
BIBLIOGRAPHY	139
APPENDIX A	151
APPENDIX B	154
APPENDIX C	155
APPENDIX D	157
VITA	175

LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1	Crime Victimization	74
Table 3.2	Significance of Crime Issue	76
Table 3.3	Assessment of Area Safety	76
Table 3.4	Fear of Crime	76
Table 3.5	Avoidance Measures	77
Table 3.6	Protective Measures	78
Table 3.7	Police Issues	81
Table 3.8	Race-Related Opinions	82
Table 3.9	Simple Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables	84
Table 3.10	Simple Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables	85
Table 3.11	Correlation Table of Household Security Measures and Tax Referenda Vote	89
Table 3.12a	MNA dues payment status by Vote in January, 1992 tax referendum	89
Table 3.12b	MNA dues payment status by Vote in July, 1992 tax referendum	90
Table 3.12c	MNA dues payment status by Vote in October, 1993 tax referendum	90
Table 3.13	Correlation Table of Fear of Victimization, Number of Avoidance Measures Taken, and Number of Protective Measures Taken	93
Table 3.14	Crosstabulation of Fear of Victimization and Payment of MNA Dues	94
Table 3.15a	Crosstabulation of Fear of Victimization and Vote in the January, 1992 Tax Referendum	95

Table 3.15b	Crosstabulation of Fear of Victimization and Vote in the July, 1992 Tax Referendum	95
Table 3.15c	Crosstabulation of Fear of Victimization and Vote in the October, 1993 Tax Referendum	96
Table 3.16	Correlation Table of Respondent's Political Ideology, Racial Attitude, and Vote in Tax Referenda	97
Table 3.17	Correlation Table of Family Status Characteristics, Number of Avoidance Measures Taken, and Number of Protective Measures Taken	98
Table 3.18a	Crosstabulation of Respondent's Marital Status and Payment of MNA Dues	98
Table 3.18b	Crosstabulation of Presence of Children in the Home and MNA Dues Payment	99
Table 3.19a	Crosstabulation of Parish Property Tax Status and Vote in January, 1992 Tax Referendum	101
Table 3.19b	Crosstabulation of Parish Property Tax Status and Vote in July, 1992 Tax Referendum	101
Table 3.19c	Crosstabulation of Parish Property Tax Status and Vote in October, 1993 Tax Referendum	102
Table 3.20a	Crosstabulation of Respondents Marital Status and Vote in January, 1992 Tax Referendum	103
Table 3.20b	Crosstabulation of Respondents Marital Status and Vote in July, 1992 Tax Referendum	103
Table 3.20c	Crosstabulation of Respondents Marital Status and Vote in October, 1993 Tax Referendum	104

Table 3.21a	Crosstabulation of Presence of Children in the Home and Vote in January, 1992 Tax Referendum	104
Table 3.21b	Crosstabulation of Presence of Children in the Home and Vote in July, 1992 Tax Referendum	105
Table 3.21c	Crosstabulation of Presence of Children in the Home and Vote in October, 1993 Tax Referendum	105
Table 3.22	Correlation Table of Respondents Education and Vote in Tax Referenda . .	106
Table 3.23	Correlation Table of Number of Associates in Area Listed by Respondent, Number of Avoidance Measures Taken and Number of Protective Measures Taken . .	108
Table 3.24	Correlation Table of Number of Associates in Area Listed by Respondent, Payment of MNA Dues, and Vote in Tax Referenda	109
Table 3.25	Regression of Avoidance Measures on Selected Variables	110
Table 3.26	Regression of Protective Measures on Selected Variables	112
Table 3.27	Logistic Regression of Association Membership on Selected Variables	113
Table 3.28	Logistic Regression of Vote in January 1992 tax referendum on Selected Variables	114
Table 3.29	Logistic Regression of Vote in July 1992 tax referendum on Selected Variables	115
Table 3.30	Logistic Regression of Vote in October 1993 tax referendum on Selected Variables	115

ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the problem of order through an analysis of individual practices of security. Because security is a multi-dimensional issue, no unified perspective currently exists to explain security practices. Based on my analysis of data from a detailed survey of 137 residents of a Baton Rouge neighborhood, I argue that there are three main dimensions of security and each has a unique set of determinants, since individuals are contextually situated in their households, neighborhoods, and municipalities.

This dissertation examines variables related to psychological, stratification, social network, and rational choice perspectives. The analysis demonstrates that although factors suggested by each of these perspectives contribute to an explanation of security, no one factor explains security-related behaviors at all levels.

I argue that citizens vary in the types of actions they take to provide security because of differential levels of trust in different agents to provide the necessary services. Some trust their own abilities to provide security for themselves, some trust neighborhood programs, and some trust the government to provide security. Because trust is a key issue in understanding

security, I propose that future research on security acknowledge the importance of trust. I suggest that part of the failure of the rational choice perspective to present a unified explanation of security is that it does not properly understand self interest. The rational choice perspective should acknowledge the relationships between trust and security, and trust and order.

Fear of crime is significantly related to individuals' personal avoidance measures. Association with neighbors is related to taking fewer protective measures in and around the home. I offer no explanation of support for contributions to the community crime-prevention organization. Trust in local government, educational attainment, and tax liability explains support for the tax millages.

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

The Problem

Sociologists have long been concerned with the "problem of order." Turner (1985) noted that classical theorists dating back to Herbert Spencer were concerned with micro processes in society which sustain the institutional order and achieve societal equilibrium. The problem of order, as classically conceived, deals with the question of how diverse interests and actors can be reconciled and integrated into a social whole. This problem gives rise to questions of social control and deviance, the place where abstract social theory meets pragmatic questions from the everyday life of individuals. In short, the **problem of order** writ small is the **problem of security** for people.

The central question of this dissertation is: What are the dimensions and determinants of security? I introduce the concept of security as the need for freedom from suffering personal or property damage or loss. Although Americans continuously rate security as a primary societal need (Miller, Tsemberis, Malia, and Grega, 1980; Farah, Barnes, and Heunk, 1979), little work has been done to study the rapid growth and change in types of security concerns and practices. Various types of security can be

purchased. Moore and Trojanowicz (1988) state that "... one of the most important privileges one acquires as one gains wealth and status in American society is the opportunity to leave the fear of crime behind" (p.2). Ninety-five percent of Americans take some type of preventive security measure (Skogan and Maxfield, 1981). However, although there is uniform agreement on the need for security, citizens differ in the way in which they address this need.

The social scientific community has also addressed the problem of security, but without any unified approach to understanding the issue. To begin to fill this gap, I first attempt to conceptualize security on a continuum from micro to macro.¹ Decisions on adoption of practices related to security are made at the individual/household level, neighborhood level, and municipal level. I attempt to explore the relationships among these three levels by asking whether security practices are complementary or substitutional among them.

¹ There is a great deal of disagreement among social scientists in defining micro, meso, and macro units of analysis. In her American Sociological Association Presidential Address, Joan Huber (1990) noted that the only agreement about definitions in micro and macro is that micro means small. It must be understood that micro, meso, and macro are relative terms and levels of analysis used in this study are simply labels attached to areas of different geographic scope.

This dissertation attempts to achieve a better understanding of the relationships among and adoption of security practices. Because appropriate levels of security and prices that are willing to be paid cannot be clearly defined by citizens, collectivities, or government officials, security is not provided through an efficient market process.

This dissertation investigates influences on individual actions related to security. It will be shown that there are different influences on practices related to micro, meso, and macro levels of security. Adoption of practices related to security is influenced by an individual's fear of crime, social status, and social network context.

In this chapter, the idea of security will be explored. I present a three-level approach in which individuals may provide, or cooperate with others to provide security for themselves, their family members, their neighbors, and fellow citizens. Second, I review three approaches that have been used to explain security-related behaviors: psychological, stratification, and social network. Each of these approaches has something to offer in explaining security behavior, but each also falls short of offering a unified and empirically testable explanation of behavior at micro, meso, and macro levels.

Next, the current status of rational choice theory is reviewed and applied to the provision of security.

Levels of Security

Humans are expected to place their greatest energies in fulfilling their most basic needs before they can focus on other needs (Maslow, 1954). Inglehart (1977) draws on the ideas of Maslow to present security as a highly valued need which comes after fulfillment of the most basic physiological and sustenance needs.

Part of the lack of a unified understanding of security comes from the diverse ways in which security-related behaviors have been studied. Protection in and around the home has been considered a very high priority (Warr and Stafford, 1983). This form of security has been studied in terms of spatial, temporal, and situational avoidance measures (DuBow, McCabe, and Kaplan, 1979), individual protective measures such as gun ownership (Wright, Rossi, and Daly, 1983), and household measures such as installing alarm systems or deadbolt locks (Skogan and Maxfield, 1981; Lavrakas et al., 1981; DuBow et al., 1979).

Most communities monitor and exclude "outsiders" through informal processes (Suttles, 1968; 1972). Some

neighborhoods may also organize formally to watch neighbors' homes and look out for "suspicious activities" (Lindsay and McGillis, 1986; Lewis, Grant, and Rosenbaum, 1988; Rosenbaum, 1987; Podolefsky and DuBow, 1981). Other communities collect money to hire supplemental policing (private security guards or extra-duty police or deputies).

Law enforcement agencies provide services used by all citizens in the metropolitan area. Though individuals must comply with the local laws and do not influence directly the local criminal justice agents, citizens are given a voice in government through electing representatives and voting for or against tax referenda that may affect the budget of the criminal justice system.²

This dissertation introduces the idea of categorizing these dimensions into micro-level measures that take place in and around the home, meso-level measures that take place

² Louisiana politics have a long history of populism and of offering a very low tax burden for medium to lower income residents. One popular law which keeps property taxes low is the Homestead Exemption, under which any residence which is assessed at or below \$ 75,000 is exempt from all parish property taxes. This exemption, together with property tax rates creates a unique tax structure. Of the 100 largest metropolitan areas in the United States, Baton Rouge had the lowest property tax assessment for comparable homes. The Baton Rouge tax rate was approximately one-fifteenth that of the area with the highest tax liability (Long Island, New York) and one-sixth that of the national median (Smith, 1993).

around the neighborhood, and macro-level measures that are provided by the municipal government.³

Micro-Level Security

Most social scientific research on security practices has been carried out at the household level (DuBow, McCabe, and Kaplan, 1979; Hindelang, Gottfredson, and Garofalo, 1978). Some of this research emphasis is based upon the belief that individuals are most concerned about defending their own homes (Warr and Stafford, 1983). Most studies have focused on the direct relationship between fear of crime⁴ and various precautionary and protective measures that are affected indirectly by ascribed and achieved characteristics such as socioeconomic status, age, and sex (DuBow et al., 1979; Skogan and Maxfield, 1981; Warr, 1990; Warr and Stafford, 1983).

³ Security is also a matter for larger political units such as nations, but the study of international security calls for a different approach. I will not address international security in this dissertation.

⁴ Fear of crime captures both perceived risk of being a victim and severity of offense. Warr and Stafford (1983) showed that individuals' highest fear was for property offenses. Respondents were more likely to be afraid of having their homes burgled while they are away than at home. While violent crime has more severe consequences, people are significantly more likely to become victims of property crime. Perceived risk plays a part in fear. Warr (1990) found that altruistic fear leads to an increased likelihood of gun ownership, but does not lead to a greater likelihood of taking other household level security precautions (Warr, 1990). This study focuses primarily on the respondents' personal fear of crime.

At the personal household (micro) level, several types of security precautions can be taken. People participate in such **avoidance behaviors** as: avoiding going out alone or at night, avoiding certain places in the city, and refusing to answer the door. Individual/household **protective actions** may include: installing security fences or alarms, installing door locks and chains, installing window locks, installing outdoor lighting, purchasing a dog for protection, owning a gun for protection, and leaving lights, televisions, or radios on when they go out.

Meso- and Macro-Level Security

Hunter (1985) stated that "to focus solely upon the household, the dwelling, or similar micro-level physical units is to miss this important, more expansive spatial characteristic of the private social order... private order is to be studied as an interaction between private and public orders" (p.235). Understanding individual-level security practices provides only a partial explanation of the other kinds of practices related to security. At the meso and macro levels we deal with a public goods problem. Still, security at meso and macro levels may be examined in terms of the ways that individuals contribute to collective enterprises.

At the neighborhood (meso) level, organizations often carry out the business of governing and providing collective services (Crenson, 1983). As with some forms of household protection, individuals can participate in security measures that cost little, such as watching neighbors' homes for suspicious activities. More important, neighborhoods organize to form neighborhood groups that are supported or funded through residents' contributions. These may provide private patrols or residents themselves may actively protect the community through citizen watches and patrols.

At the municipal (macro) level, the state provides a justice system with police, courts, and prisons. Although taxpayers are not given a choice of whether or not they will pay taxes, they do have a voice in governmental decisions through such mechanisms as tax referenda (Hahn and Kamieniecki, 1987). The state provides a criminal justice system with laws and police. Because the government is the primary provider of public goods, influencing the government is essential in all collective consumption issues. Both the benefit and cost of policing are shared by all taxpaying citizens, with several organized interests competing for public benefits (Castells, 1977, 1983; Rich, 1982a, 1982b) and the

redistribution of the tax burden (Peterson, 1981; Lo, 1990; Hahn and Kamieneki, 1987).

Although security is a nearly universally valued good, taking action at one level has no necessary or obvious relation with taking actions at other levels. I will argue that no one single factor explains participation in security behaviors at all levels, and that influences on support for one type of security do not predict support at other levels. Meso and macro levels of security differ from the individual level because they involve goods made available through collective rather than individual action. Meso and macro issues also differ in the types and amounts of legitimate formal coercion that can be used by the collectivity.

The Free Rider Problem

For many years, social scientists have been preoccupied with the free rider problem for public goods. Coleman (1990a) defines this problem in two parts: first, many goods cannot be provided without a collective contribution and second, individuals have no incentive to contribute to the provision of collective goods unless they are sanctioned by the collective. By definition, a public good is one whose benefits are non-excludable; because selective incentives are in many cases unavailable in

public goods, all individuals receive the benefit. Also, it is clear that some people benefit more than others. Some people receive latent rewards, or make use of the benefit more than others.

One of the primary questions that rational choice theory must address is "to what extent will people contribute to public goods?" One rational choice explanation is that people base their decisions on their overall costs and benefits (Homans, 1961; Coleman, 1990a; Blau, 1964). Olson (1965) pointed out that through a simple cost-benefit analysis, the most rational action for individuals is not to contribute and to simply receive the benefit cost-free rather than contributing to the costs of public goods, hence the term "free rider." If the good is provided by the collective, individuals may be able to receive the service without contributing. This action maximizes their "profit," and seems to encourage free riding. Free riding appears to pay off. Of course, if a significant number of community members did not contribute, no public good would ever be provided.

I argue that the problem of public goods differs at meso and macro levels. At the meso level, communities offer a different set of incentives and sanctions for participation and free riding than those offered at the macro level. At the meso level, many communities lack

formal sanctioning structures but have different capacities to sanction members informally. At the macro level, the state offers citizens the right to vote and to voice opinions on political issues, but requires compliance with laws.

Various explanations of public goods provision have been provided. Hechter (1987) argues that individual contributions to groups are made because members are frequently motivated by "benefitting when the group benefits." Therefore, understanding group solidarity is important to understanding the provision of public goods. Coleman (1990a) argued that individuals receive "psychic benefits" when their actions are similar to those of their peers.

Recent literature has documented the growth of collective, non-governmental organizations designed to reduce crime (Podolefsky and DuBow, 1981; Lewis, Grant, and Rosenbaum, 1988). Rich (1980, p.571) explained the production of security at the neighborhood level and the free rider problem that this kind of collective action faces:

No single citizen is likely to be able to reduce crime in a neighborhood by individual effort. If a number of residents cooperate in a successful crime prevention program, however, all residents will reap the benefit of the collective good produced by their efforts (a reduced risk of

victimization) regardless of whether or not they took part in the program.

I will address the problem of security as both an individual action and collective goods issue. Adoption of security practices and support for security measures is influenced through a complex process of individual need fulfillment and social forces.

Approaches to Understanding Security

In this second section, I outline three approaches that have been used to explain human behavior. These approaches are not mutually exclusive and empirical support for one approach is not necessarily inconsistent with support for others. Each approach attempts to explain security behaviors at the micro, meso, and macro levels. Each partially succeeds and partially fails in accounting for the problem of understanding security provision.

The Psychological Approach

The psychological approach assumes that individuals act in their own self interest, often disregarding the welfare of others. Social order takes place through an "invisible hand" in which goods valued by the individual aid society and goods valued by society aid individuals. Because individuals act in their own self-interest, regardless of the surrounding circumstances, there is no need to study common values or patterns of relations with

others in order to understand their actions. Societal action is the aggregate of all individual actions.

The psychological approach accounts for the adoption of security behavior by arguing that these actions promote individual psychological well being. The study of fear of crime presents a paradox in that those most fearful are often the least likely to be victimized (Lewis and Salem, 1986; DuBow et al., 1979). The dependent dimension in this study is not fear, but rather actions taken to provide security. But there is a link between these two phenomena: Fear motivates individuals to take precautionary behaviors that lower their risk of becoming crime victims (Moore and Trojanowicz, 1988). Those with the highest levels of personal fear are most likely to take avoidance behaviors (Warr, 1984; Skogan and Maxfield, 1981).

However, research on protective actions (specifically, gun ownership) has produced mixed findings. Wright, Rossi, and Daly (1983), and Delmas and Bankston (1993) found no relationship between fear of crime and gun ownership. But Smith and Uchida (1988) and Warr (1992) found a significant relationship between fear of crime and purchasing a gun for protection.⁵ Studies of the relationship between fear of crime and adoption of other types of protective measures

⁵ Warr (1992) found no relationship between fear for others and protective measures, except for gun ownership.

have also produced mixed findings (DuBow, McCabe, and Kaplan, 1979).

Attitudes such as trust in local government and racial beliefs influence human behavior, especially at the political level (Key, 1949; Carmines and Stimson, 1989). However, until recently, social scientific literature has generally neglected the linkage between governmental trust and electoral support for crime issues, and the race-crime-electoral behavior relationship.

Criticism of the Psychological Approach

One major deficiency of the psychological perspective is that it provides an explanation of security measures only at the household (micro) level. Household-level security is only one aspect of the general puzzle of how people address their security concerns. At the meso and macro levels we deal with a public goods problem. From time to time, some people defy what appears to be their own best interest, refrain from free riding, and act in an altruistic manner. Communities most fearful of crime are not more likely to take on several types of neighborhood-level security measures (Lavrakas et al., 1981), nor are they more likely to vote for higher taxes to expand the criminal justice system (Hahn and Kamieniecki, 1987). Attitudes do affect electoral behavior, but discovering the most salient attitudes opens up a new series of debates.

The Stratification Approach

Stratification theory has been used as a response to the problem of social order. Cultural distinctions and environmental conditions create opportunities and constraints for actors' behavior. Ascribed and achieved statuses affect individuals' access to resources, and also impose constraints on social action.

Two statuses that are believed to affect citizen's adoption of security measures are socioeconomic status (Lavrakas et al, 1981) and life course stage (Knoke and Thomson, 1977). Individuals in these situations are expected to develop certain beliefs and act in certain ways.

Marx claimed that patterns of stratification lead to formation of solidary groups forming a collective class conscience that expresses constraint. People residing in individual neighborhoods are likely to share similar socioeconomic status. The combination of sharing residential location and social class has led to expectations that these people have similar interests on a number of issues (Logan and Molotch, 1987; Lo, 1990).

Crime is a political issue in the sense that the issue has symbolic and instrumental aspects. Symbolic politics is concerned with status and public affirmations that a particular group is right or morally correct (Gusfield,

1963). Class-based groups not only share common interests, but also form they form coalitions that struggle against outgroup members for the control and benefits of public resources (Castells, 1977). Because public goods lead to competition for resources, race and socioeconomic status have been noted as key factors in electoral politics dealing with the distribution of resources (Carmines and Stimson, 1989). Hahn and Kamieniecki express the view that "while high status voters may be willing to utilize their resources to support local services in the communities in which they live, they apparently are not prepared to subsidize the disadvantaged" (1987, p.124).

Race is a status variable. Research has shown that fear of crime decreases for whites as their level of neighborhood racial segregation increases. Liska, Lawrence, and Sanchirico (1982) explain this relationship by noting crime between culturally dissimilar people is more threatening and fear-producing than crime between culturally similar people. It is associated with greater uncertainty, unpredictability, and danger than intraracial crime. Therefore, people pay a premium to live in all white neighborhoods and avoid interaction with blacks (Smith, 1982).

Criticism of the Stratification Approach

The stratification approach has been criticized on three primary grounds. First of all, although status may explain why actors share similar constraints, some actors deviate from expected behaviors. Many theorists assume similar constraints for all actors in a particular group, but some actors facing similar structural constraints, with similar access to information, develop different attitudes and behavior. Another criticism of stratification analysis is that if shared structural conditions lead to behavior, why does collective action not occur more often? Free riders still exist even though actors face similar constraints within the structure. A third criticism is that models of collective action often take constraints as fixed for all actors in empirical settings (Ostrum, 1990). The stratification approach does not account for different values among all actors in the system and aggregates with similar characteristics often act differentially. For example, there is a great deal of variability in the actions of white middle class American groups.

The Social Network Approach

The concept of social structure separates sociology from other fields of behavioral analysis (Wellman and Berkowitz, 1988). The social network approach to structure was created as a response to the ideas in basic

psychological and economic theories that society is the product of actors behaving in their own self interest. Social networks may be analyzed in order to understand how actors choices and constraints grow out of and are influenced by relations with others.

Earlier concepts of norm-driven behavior and "internalization of norms" offered little explanatory power. Social network analysts measure the structure of social networks and use that structure, rather than the internalized drives and motivations of individuals, to explain social action. Proponents of this perspective argue that the structure of social networks both facilitates and constrains social action. Social structure also affects the formation of social networks. Demographic and social structures affect individuals' opportunities for individuals to develop relationships with others (Blau, 1977; McPherson, 1981). For example, network structure has been shown to vary by such characteristics as gender (Moore, 1990), race (Marsden, 1977), and marital status (Hurlbert and Acock, 1989).

The social network approach to the problem of security stresses that the characteristics of the social network in which an actor is embedded affect the types of security measures that he or she takes. Those actors who have denser networks are more likely to be influenced by their

close associates and will be more likely to adopt the structurally prescribed behavior. Individuals interacting most frequently with neighbors are more likely to be influenced through conversations and interaction (Coleman, 1990a). They face a potential for greater social pressure (subject themselves to meaningful sanctions) to act in the culturally proscribed and prescribed manners (Hechter, 1987). At the meso and macro levels, actors possessing allegiance to a group (Coleman, 1990a; Coleman, Katz, and Menzel, 1966) or sharing equivalent positions in society's structure (Burt, 1987) are expected to participate in more "pro-group" behavior.

Granovetter's (1982) "strength of weak ties" thesis argues that in areas which have higher proportion of weak ties (e.g. friends of friends, acquaintances) rather than strong ties (e.g. close friends, relatives), information will diffuse more rapidly. This argument may point to a mechanism that explains why some neighborhoods take security actions and others fail to do so: Some residents may not know about the existence of neighborhood-level security actions. Other residents may not believe that the neighborhood-level actions provide sufficient benefits to justify the cost of their individual contributions.

Comparing isolates and non-isolates in a system, Coleman, Katz, and Menzel (1966) showed that ideas are

adopted by actors who are more embedded in the social system. Balance theory (Heider, 1958; Newcomb, 1961) would predict that associates are likely to hold similar attitudes. If A, B, and C are actors in a structure, and A and B support an issue, then C is highly likely to support the same issue. This approach suggests there will be an effect of community integration on household security measures even though these decisions are personal and are made privately.

Another way that social networks may affect action indirectly comes about in explaining the psychological perspective. Integration in a social network affects fear of victimization (Warr, 1990; Hunter and Baumer, 1982). The presence of others can be assuring, or alternatively can cause greater levels of fear and the key to understanding reactions to others is familiarity (Warr, 1990; Goffman, 1971). Cities are populated by strangers (Wirth, 1938; Lofland, 1973) and social integration reduces fear by reducing the proportion of strangers people interact with in everyday life and reducing the strangeness of routine life in the neighborhood (Hunter and Baumer, 1982). Another argument for the indirect effects of social networks derives from their influence on attitude formation (Newcomb, 1961; Straits, 1990).

Criticism of the Social Network Approach

The social network perspective has been subject to criticism. The primary critique of social network theory is that it is too purely structural and ignores the content of ties, without which it is difficult to predict anything (Kilburn, 1992).

Social network theorists also have a problem in explaining the influence of levels of integration. Though numerous studies have shown that people act in a similar manner to others in their social network (Homans, 1950; Newcomb, 1961; Coleman, Katz, and Menzel, 1966), the process influencing these behaviors is subject to debate. Are individuals more likely to act like the people they are close to or are they more likely to act like people with whom they share similar status? Homans (1950), and Coleman (1990a) argue that socializing bonds are influential in diffusing information and influence in proscribing and prescribing appropriate actions. Burt (1987) showed that actors sharing a frame of reference with those having similar patterns of relations within the social structure (structural equivalence) are likely to act in a similar manner to those people significantly more than actors tied together by socializing bonds.

The content of ties differ with individuals in various types of networks. Not only do characteristics of networks

differ among people, each individual interacts among diverse types of networks on an everyday basis. Current social network theory does offer an explanation of power and influence in networks.

The Rational Choice Approach

The psychological, stratification, and social network approaches have failed to explain the free rider problem. I attempt to present a modified rational choice theory as an empirically testable approach to the social phenomenon of security that applies to the micro, meso, and macro levels. This theory addresses all three of Coleman's (1990a, p.11) components of systemic behavior theory:

- a) A set of roles that players take on, each role defining the interests or goals of the player.
- b) Rules about the kinds of actions that are allowable for players in each role, as well as about the order of play.
- c) Rules specifying the consequences that each player's action has for other players in the game.

Rational choice theory borrows from all three of the previously mentioned perspectives. From the psychological perspective, rational choice uses the concept of the value of the private or public good. From the stratification perspective, rational choice theory looks at similarly situated actors sharing the development of norms, interests, and values. Rational choice theory uses the

social network perspective to explain the role of sanctioning ability of others in influencing participation in collective actions and the internalization of norms.

James Coleman's (1990a) *Foundations of Social Theory* outlines a version of rational choice theory that seeks to account for the functioning of a social system. Coleman's aim for rational choice theory is not to eliminate other environmental and structural influences as explanations but instead to account for behaviors they fail to explain. Rational choice theory explains how a norm arises and the type and effectiveness of sanctions that enforce the norm. The task is to explain social phenomena, not the behavior of individuals: "A norm is a property of a social system, not an action within it" (Coleman, 1990b, p.35). Coleman's theory is one of purposive action in which actors seek maximization of utility under constraints of social context: "We say that we understand the 'reasons' why the person acted in a certain way, implying that we understand the intended goal and how the actions were seen by the actor to contribute to that goal" (Coleman, 1990a; p.13).

Rational choice theory has traditionally been vexed with the problem of explaining institutional genesis⁶ (Hechter, Opp, Wippler, 1990). Rational choice theory can

⁶ Coleman defines institutional genesis as the creation and

be extended to explain security provision as a product of the interaction between actors' needs to obtain welfare and deference goods. Welfare goods are directly provided material goods, while deference goods are indirectly provided as personal gratification (Lasswell and Kaplan, 1950).

Rational choice theory can be applied to the adoption of individual-level security behaviors. Exchange does not take place in a vacuum. Although the value of the good is an important incentive for action, social exchange analysis focuses on alters' conduct and too frequently ignores ego's personal traits (Blau, 1964). Relationships are dynamic and interactive. The network defines normative behavior that influences actions and constitutes a structural constraint by placing an individual in an environment with a relatively small set of options (Jankowski, 1992).

Although the theoretical problem is explaining action and outcomes in a social system, Coleman's theory is based on an individual-level theory of action. Whereas some may criticize individual level analysis of groups form because individuals cannot efficiently achieve their own ends by themselves (Smith, 1981 {1786}; deToqueville, 1956 {1835}).

Because free riding appears to be a rational action, Coleman (1990a) argues that we are faced with two problems. The first-order public good problem comes about when each

individual will benefit only from the contribution of others. The second-order public good problem is that sanctioning free riders may be costly to the collective (Heckathorn, 1989). Both norm development and norm maintenance require that individuals in a system legitimate and internalize norms. The first-order good problem is solved from either individuals valuing the good or from some outside threat.

Coleman (1990a) and Hechter (1987) suggest that the free rider problem can be understood in terms of solidarity. Relationships of reciprocity discourage defection from contributing to a good. Actors more enmeshed in the community are more likely to comply with collective rules because they are the most likely to lose something in the sanctioning process. Those embedded in the system are more likely to internalize norms join with like-minded individuals in order to produce the good.

From a systemic perspective, effective norms must be enforced by sanctions. Legitimacy is a necessary condition for providing a consistent explanation of behavioral influence. In becoming dependent on a collective, people give others legitimacy to sanction their own behavior. At first this may not seem like a rational act, but by giving up this right to control one's own behavior, a person affiliates with a legitimated collective with power over

its members. Those observing norms receive a right to impose sanctions on norm violators, while those not observing the norm have less power in imposing those norms on others. Rational egoists choose to belong to a group because they are dependent on other members (Thibaut and Kelley, 1959). Coleman summarized this by stating: "If a person comes to identify with a socializing agent, that is, to see his interests as identical to those of the agent, then the claim by the agent of a right to control will be seen as legitimate, because it is a claim deriving from interests the person sees as his own" (1990a, p. 289).

Coleman expands rational choice theory to explain the free rider problem for individual behavior within macro-level actions. He acknowledges that voting behavior seems to be a difficult problem for rational choice theorists. Even in small local elections, one vote is not likely to affect the outcome. Thus, even though the cost of voting is minimal in time and effort, the manifest reward is arguably negligible. Coleman explains that "psychic benefits" are offered to voters through acting in a manner similar to their reference group.

Hechter (1987) stresses visibility of actions in understanding the free rider problem. In order for groups to control the behavior of members, the targeted behaviors

must be monitored and the group must have the right to sanction individual actors. Monitoring capacity depends on the degree to which it possesses information about individual compliance with corporate rules or obligations. In sanctioning group members, the group must be able to encourage compliance and/or discourage deviance from group norms.

Group size affects both the monitoring and sanctioning capacity of the group. Monitoring behavior has variable costs, dependent on the visibility of the behavior and the size of the group. Less valuable goods and private behaviors are less visible and create more sanctioning costs. This follows modernization theories, in which individuals are taken from their web of "gemeinschaft" (cohesive, intimate) relationships and placed into less intricate "gesellschaft" (disengaged, impersonal) relationships (Toennies, 1957). It could be argued that modernization leads to a reduction in local intimacy. Individuals face greater obligations in a gemeinschaft relationship than they do in dealing with the faceless members of the gesellschaft population. Members of a large group are more likely to be able to act in anonymity, so sanctioning costs may be high, requiring coercion that is legitimized by a larger aggregate. Hechter (1987) proposed that those with closer ties to the community are more

dependent on the group, and this leads to greater group obligations.

At the macro level, Hechter claims that formal controls are developed for legitimated coercion, such as a municipal criminal justice system. As for applying the free rider argument to voting behavior, this solidarity explanation must assume internalization of a belief system that leads to the altruistic behavior of going to the polls and casting a ballot. This theory neglects the value of the good: Those valuing the good are expected to be more compliant with the group's expectations. Individuals value goods differently. When people pay the same amount of money for the same service but value the service differently, one achieves higher profit than the other.

Summary

The problem of order writ small is the problem of security. Security can be viewed at three discrete levels: the household or micro level, the neighborhood or meso level, and the municipal or macro level. Although the relationships between levels are clearly an important sociological problem, sociologists have been slow to address the issue. Although patterns of collective action enhance or reduce security at all levels, individual actors' support for one level of security is not

necessarily an accurate predictor of support at another level. The public goods problem makes security at meso and macro levels a different question than that of individual adoption. Meso and macro levels of security differ because residents of neighborhoods differ in the cost they are willing to bear to obtain the public good as well as the benefits they receive from the public good. Initially, free riding appears to be a rational action.

I have presented three approaches that have been used to understand the problem of security provision but fail to provide an adequate solution to the problem of security, primarily because of their failure to address the implications of the free rider problem. The psychological approach is advantageous because it offers a simple explanation of the problem: Fear of victimization causes actors to take a variety of individual precautions. However, the psychological approach does not account for why individuals with the same level of fear may contribute differently to collective action.

The stratification approach offers the idea that personal traits such as socioeconomic status, age, and race are the primary influences on certain types of action related to security concerns. People in different social positions defined by status characteristics (e.g. stages of the life course or different social classes) have

distinctive interests and means to address problems. A shortcoming of this approach is that many areas with similar status characteristics have the potential to act a certain way but do not. Similar groups may differ in levels of altruism and free riding (Hechter, 1987).

The social network approach proposes that the primary determinants of behavior are patterns of relationships. People associating with like others will participate in similar types of behavior at all levels of security. Though the concept of rootedness has been successful in predicting contributions to public goods, the social network approach does not address differences between levels. Rootedness in a neighborhood may actually lead to an organized neighborhood movement that opposes contributions to a municipal-level good. The linkage between integration in the community social network and the adoption of similar household actions remains unclear.

The rational choice approach addresses security practices at all three levels, accounting for private and public goods. Rational choice accounts for micro-level security by examining the value of the good and psychic benefits offered through action that follows prescribed norms. Rational choice also proposes a solution to the free rider problem by mapping out influence in the social network.

In the next chapter, hypotheses derived from psychological, stratification, social network, and rational choice approaches will be developed. I will describe a single neighborhood in Baton Rouge as a strategic research context in which to test hypotheses on security practices in a stable, bounded system of homogeneous actors. This chapter uses census data, personal interviews, and newspaper reports to describe the social context, political environment, and cultural history of one particular neighborhood, focusing on the need and provision of security services at all levels. A survey of 137 residents of the neighborhood I will call "Midtown" provides data to test empirically each approach to understanding the problem of security.

Chapter three tests these hypotheses using multivariate analytical techniques. First, I test the congruence among support for security measures at the micro, meso, and macro levels. Then, I test the significance of factors deemed important in each theoretical approach to predicting provision of each level of security.

Chapter four discusses the findings presented in chapter three. I address the central finding that each dimension of security has a unique set of determinants. Because of this, no single variable or combination of

variables is related directly to participation in or support for household, neighborhood, and municipal security measures. I argue that the concept of trust needs to be incorporated or central to the study of security in order to understand its micro, meso, and macro dimensions.

CHAPTER 2. SECURITY-RELATED HYPOTHESES

Introduction

This chapter outlines hypotheses on the relations among and determinant of security practices at various levels. First, I present hypotheses on the relationships among levels of security. Next, I present hypotheses on the adoption of or support for security measures at household, neighborhood, and civic levels. This will be accomplished using each of the psychological, stratification, social network, and rational choice perspectives. Finally, I describe the research site, data, and variables used to test the hypotheses.

Individual responses to crime are hotly debated issues in governmental policy. A platform addressing citizens' rights to own handguns for personal protection contributed to electoral support for Louisiana's newly elected Governor Mike Foster. Security companies that supply guards and alarm systems are growth industries in the United States.

Crime is a social problem that requires a collective response. Though individuals may be able to protect themselves and prevent some crimes, for thousands of years societies have had criminal justice systems employing specialists. However, people often fall into the trap of collective goods, in which everyone believes that the good

is of benefit but not everyone is willing to contribute to its provision.

Just as free riding may occur in a neighborhood, there is concern that neighborhoods may contribute to private provision of services (such as security) to the exclusion of support for governmental services that are shared with other citizens in the municipality (McKenzie, 1994; Reich, 1991). Although all citizens pay taxes and receive the benefits of protection by the government's criminal justice system, citizens do have a voice in government that influences their tax liability and governmental service delivery. The growing number of affluent neighborhoods providing private security services leads to the question: "Does private government lead to a withdrawal of support for municipal governments?"

Household, Community, and Municipal Level Hypotheses

In the last chapter, I introduced the idea that security may be viewed within a three-level framework: the household level, the neighborhood level, and the municipal level. However, the outstanding question that has been addressed by no prior study is whether security practices at these various levels tend to be substitutional or complementary. If security-related behaviors are predominantly a substitutional phenomenon, residents taking

one set of measures are less likely to support other types of security measures. For example, those residents taking actions in and around their home may be less likely to support contributions for private duty patrolling or supplementing the citywide police force. Conversely, those contributing to the neighborhood patrol and city police may be less inclined to take extra measures in and around their homes.

However, the alternative argument is that security are complementary phenomena, with residents who take more security measures in and around the home being more likely to support contributions for private-duty patrolling to supplement the citywide police force. This might be the case if security is more highly valued by some individuals, who are then motivated to invest in diverse security measures. Weapons purchases (McDowall and Loftin, 1983) and neighborhood association formation may begin as a response to the perceived lack of police efficacy. When individuals take action at the household level, they are less likely to want to spend money and energy supporting other levels of security. However, because defense of one's own home and the area around it is viewed as a top priority (Warr and Stafford, 1983), I expect to find a strong positive relationship between household security measures and participation in neighborhood associations.

H₁: Those taking a larger number of household security measures will be more likely to join neighborhood associations promoting security.

I expect to find support for the thesis that household and civic-level security support are essentially constituted as private behaviors that are not susceptible to sanctions from other members of the community. Neighborhood order differs from the individual and public orders in that the actors are not dealing with "a world of strangers" (Hunter, 1985; Lofland, 1973; Fischer, 1984). Although residents of a given geographic area are subject to similar socialization pressures (Shevky and Bell, 1955; Festinger, Schacter, and Back, 1950), community influence is exerted only on behaviors that can be publicly sanctioned. Because voting is a private action, often kept secret among close friends (Laumann, 1973), household and civic behaviors are private and are less likely to be influenced by network members.

H₂: Support for household security measures will be positively related to support for civic-level security measures.

In the context of neighborhood crime prevention, actors behave in a less anonymous public manner. "Community coercion" influences participation regardless of personal support for extra-duty patrolling.⁷ Due to its

⁷ In one study, police patrolling was not found to significantly reduce crime levels, nor did it reduce fear

confidential nature, voting is a private act. Moreover, paying a fee for neighborhood patrolling in addition to paying taxes for a police department leads to the dilemma of "double taxation" (Reich, 1991). Residents paying for community patrolling may be satisfied with their level of protection for their home and family. However, some people are not interested in contributing to public goods at either the neighborhood or the municipal level. Others may contribute to all types of security because they value the feeling of safety. These cross-pressures lead to various configurations of support for or opposition to additional taxes. Therefore, I expect to find no relationship between participation in neighborhood-level security measures and support for civic-level measures.

H₃: Membership in the neighborhood association will not be significantly related to electoral support for civic-level security measures.

Psychological Hypotheses

In this section, the expected relationship between fear of crime and security measures is discussed as the focal point for understanding individual actions related to security provision. In addressing security at the household (micro) level, several types of precautions can

of crime, attitudes toward police, or the number of preventive measures taken. This may mean that joining neighborhood associations has results other than reducing fear of crime (Kelling et al, 1974).

be taken which have been shown to decrease victimization levels for some types of crime (Miethe, 1991).

The problem of security extends beyond actual victimization. The psychological perspective suggests that people taking measures related to security may be seeking to reduce their fear of crime. Although actual victimization affects directly only a small percentage of the population, nearly everyone alters their lifestyle to some degree out of fear of victimization. Spatial and temporal avoidance are among the most common responses to fear of crime (DuBow et al, 1979; Skogan and Maxfield, 1981). Low-cost avoidance behaviors include: avoiding going out alone or at night, avoiding certain places in the city, and refusing to answer the door. However, protective actions are technical in nature, requiring modification of the household environment such as: installing security fences or alarms, door locks and chains, window locks, or outdoor lighting; purchasing a dog for protection; and owning a gun (DuBow et al, 1979; Skogan and Maxfield, 1981).

Skogan (1977) and Hindelang et al. (1978) argue that individuals who are most fearful should be the most likely to take security measures. However, empirical research has shown that this relationship is not that simple: Those

with the highest levels of personal fear are most likely to take on avoidance behaviors (Warr, 1984; Skogan and Maxfield, 1981). Research on protective actions (specifically, the study of gun ownership) has produced mixed findings (DuBow, McCabe, and Kaplan, 1979; Wright et al., 1983).

Fear of becoming a victim does lead to the adoption of protective actions. Females and the elderly have the highest levels of fear of crime because they are more likely to view themselves as vulnerable, and less likely to be able to defend themselves (Warr, 1984; Hindelang, Gottfredson, and Garofalo, 1978). I hypothesize that those most afraid of being victimized are more likely to take avoidance and protective measures.

H_{4a}: Fear of crime will be strongly and positively related to the number of avoidance measures taken.

H_{4b}: Fear of crime will be weakly and positively related to the number of protective behaviors taken.

There should be differences between members and non-members of neighborhood associations. Residents may differ in their assessment of security needs and may also have different beliefs about the efficacy of the association. Podolefsky and DuBow (1981) studied differences between members and non-members of neighborhood crime prevention groups. They found no difference between the two groups in

perceptions of crime, neighborhood conditions, or the efficacy of collective crime prevention activities. In their study of voluntary block association membership, Rich and Wandersman (1983) showed that psychological factors such as feelings of control over one's life, personal satisfaction, and political cynicism were unrelated to membership.

H₃: Fear of crime will not be significantly related to neighborhood association membership.

Because the government is the primary distributor of public goods, influencing the government is essential in all collective consumption issues. Because the police have been viewed as bearing primary responsibility for deterring crime, the public's fear of crime may work to the benefit of the police when asking for more resources (Moore and Trojanowicz, 1988). The state has legitimated coercion; therefore, all citizens must pay taxes and can only voice their support or opposition to governmental services (Hirschman, 1970). This voice is articulated through the electoral process and opinion polls, but the former has a direct impact on the level of police resources that will be provided. I predict that those most fearful are most likely to support the idea of paying a premium for extra protection:

H₀: Those most fearful of crime will be more likely to support tax referenda to provide supplemental funding for the criminal justice system.

Because public goods do lead to competition for resources, race has been noted as a key factor in electoral politics dealing with the distribution of resources (Carmines and Stimson, 1989). Citizens do not vote directly on racial issues, but there is a tendency for white citizens (especially in the South) to identify themselves as having shared interests that are defined by a perceived conflict with the interests of blacks (Davidson, 1972). Tax referenda issues may be especially salient in racially segregated neighborhoods, with white middle-class residents viewing their extra tax dollars paying for extra policing in high crime (or black) neighborhoods.

H_a: Those residents with stronger anti-black beliefs will be more likely to vote against law enforcement tax referenda.

Conservative political ideology is often believed to be related to anti-tax sentiment. Even though conservatives are often believed to be more concerned with law and order political issues, they also are more likely to question the way governmental funds are allocated, with the implication that the government spends enough money on crime but does not spend it wisely.

H_b: Residents with more conservative political ideologies will be more likely to vote against the tax referenda.

Stratification Hypotheses

Ascribed and achieved social statuses may influence individual decisions to adopt specific practices related to security. Variables such as being married, owning a home, and having higher incomes have been shown to be related to taking precautionary measures (Lavrakas et al., 1981).⁸ Also, the presence of children may alter adults' perspectives on crime from individual fear to altruistic fear (e.g. fear for a spouse and for children) (Warr, 1992). Although prior research has not addressed the relationship between life course stage and participation in crime-prevention organizations, the sociological literature has shown that life course constraints affect membership in various types of voluntary organizations. Obligations create incentives to join organizations, though time constraints may inhibit active membership when young children are in the home (Knoke and Thomson, 1977). Further, families in the child-rearing stage of the life cycle are more likely to value enhanced police protection.

⁸ Individual residents and neighborhoods with higher incomes make a relatively smaller sacrifice when they allocate funds for security measures (Knoke and Thomson, 1977). Because there is very little variance in the neighborhood studied, I do not analyze income as a variable.

However, they are also more likely to face constraints of having less free time and disposable income to contribute to joint goods.

Marxist scholars argue that residents who share a location depend on the same service provision, leading them to develop similar interests in the procurement of a service (Castells, 1977; 1983). Membership in specific socioeconomic groups suggests probable voting actions (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, 1948). For example, "stakeholders" in the community are more likely to act in a pro-community manner, protecting themselves and their neighbors from the possibility of property devaluation (Logan and Molotch, 1987).

Lo (1990) has shown that homeowners form coalitions to keep property taxes low because they believe that they are paying a disproportionate share of tax revenue for the amount of goods and services they receive from the government. Policing is a good that is of common interest to all citizens and is shared by everyone, but the wealthy pay more for the service because they pay higher taxes. The general public often views crime as a problem in "the other guy's neighborhood," with other areas getting worse while the respondent's own area is viewed as stable (DuBow et al., 1979).

H_{9a} : Married householders will take more avoidance measures.

H_{9b} : Individuals who have children in the home will take more avoidance measures.

H_{10a} : Married householders will take more precautionary measures.

H_{10b} : Individuals who have children in the home will take more precautionary measures.

At the community level, research has shown that homogeneous, middle-class areas are in a better position to organize and provide social control than less affluent areas (Skogan, 1990; Bursik and Grasmick, 1993; Guest and Oropesa, 1986; Oropesa, 1989; Crenson, 1983). Home ownership increases one's stake in the community, which encourages residents to improve the community and provide social control (Crenson, 1983). Logan and Molotch (1987) and Castells (1983) have discussed the role of community organization development as a tool for the preservation of homeowners' property values.

Residents may differ in their assessment of the security deficit and they may also have different beliefs about the efficacy of the system. Podolefsky and DuBow (1981) studied differences between members and non-members of neighborhood crime prevention groups. They found no difference in perceptions of crime, neighborhood conditions, or the efficacy of collective crime prevention activities. Although family protection generates

commitments, neighborhood association membership may be too far removed from the same influences on protective measures taken in and around the house.

H_{10a}: There will be no relationship between being married and neighborhood association membership.

H_{10b}: There will be no relationship between having children in the home and neighborhood association membership.

H_{10c}: There will be no relationship between educational attainment and neighborhood association membership.

Both the benefit and cost of policing are shared by all classes (though not equally), with several organized interests competing for public benefits (Castells, 1977, 1983; Rich, 1982a, 1982b). Traditionally, membership in specific socioeconomic groups suggests probable voting actions (Lazarsfeld et al, 1948), but within a single homogeneous community income is not expected to be related to participation.

Tax liability will be explored for its influence on voting behavior. Hahn and Kamienecki (1987) argue that "while high status voters may be willing to utilize their resources to support local services in the communities in which they live, they apparently are not prepared to subsidize the disadvantaged" (p.124). Louisiana's homestead exemption law creates two groups of residents: those exempt from parish property taxes, and those that

must pay parish property taxes. Surprisingly, research has shown that even though they pay more in taxes, the wealthy are often more supportive of tax increases than middle-income people. Wilson and Banfield (1964) explain this phenomenon as a function of diminishing marginal utility in which wealthier citizens make less of a sacrifice to pay additional taxes. However, Weaver and Parent (1994) show that this finding of wealthier citizens being more willing to support taxes holds only for **developmental** programs that improve the condition of the entire metropolitan area and not **redistributive** programs that provide more services for one section (most often less affluent) of the city.

Because crime is often viewed as a problem in "the other guy's neighborhood," I expect that a tax for enhanced criminal justice revenue will discourage some people from supporting the tax. Enhanced police protection may be viewed as developmental by some citizens and redistributive by others.

H₁₁: There will be no relationship between tax liability and electoral support for the tax referenda.

Because both electoral support and adoption of security measures by individual households are largely subject to individual decision-making processes, I argue

that an effect similar to household adoption processes will occur.

H₁₂: Married individuals and those who have children in the home will be more likely to vote for tax referenda which support supplemental policing measures.

Social Network Hypotheses

DeToqueville stated that civic associations are built through reciprocity among members (1956 {1835}).

Commitment to community varies, with homeowners and those with dense neighborhood relations being more willing to commit resources to the community. Length of residence and community attachment have been shown to be strongly related to residential stability and commitment to community organizations in previous studies⁹ (Kasarda and Janowitz, 1974).

Toennies (1957) and Wirth (1938) are among theorists who have criticized the idea that communities offer solidarity and opportunities for social support in the modern age. Theories based on this tradition have been labeled "Community Lost" approaches (Wellman, 1979). Both Wellman (1979) and Wellman and Wortley (1990) have refuted

⁹ Neighborhood interaction can be measured in terms of the frequency of informal interaction (Keller, 1968). Kasarda and Janowitz measured informal community participation through interaction with other residents and formal organization participation through a series of questions about participation in several different types of community organizations.

the Community Lost approach by showing that many ties still exist among members of communities. The ties may be weak and single-stranded (offering minimal amounts of support and low levels of intimacy) but they do exist. Ties are no longer geographically bound. Podolefsky and DuBow (1981) found a significant difference between community organization participants and non-participants in that individuals who were more integrated into the community were more likely to participate.

Rich and Wandersman (1983) studied membership in urban neighborhood voluntary block associations. Demographic variables such as race, education, and occupation were not related to membership in these associations. Nor were psychological factors such as feelings of control over one's life, personal satisfaction, and political cynicism related to membership. Instead, variables reflecting "rootedness," such as length of residence and residential stability in the community (Kasarda and Janowitz, 1974; Hunter, 1975; Lewis and Salem, 1986; Sampson, 1988) and having a number of ties in the area (Guest and Oropesa, 1986; Crenson, 1983) are believed to influence involvement in the neighborhood.

Isolates have a greater fear of crime (Fischer, 1982) and are expected to take a greater number of measures to avoid being victimized. Because knowledge of neighbors

decreases the number of "strangers" in the area (Hunter and Baumer, 1982), there is a greater freedom to interact around the neighborhood. Because residents more integrated in the community are expected to know more about the community, they are more able to differentiate "strangers" from neighbors and will take fewer avoidance measures.

H_{13a}: Those more integrated in the community will take fewer avoidance measures.

However, Skogan (1977) found that integration into the community social network may lead to increased levels of neighborhood gossip that can in turn, lead to more knowledge of neighborhood crime and higher levels of fear. Having knowledge of other burglary victims positively affects the employment of protective measures against burglary (Lavrakas et al., 1981). While knowledge of neighbors may protect individuals from personal crime, this knowledge offers little protection from property crime when the resident is away from home. Because of this, I predict no relationship between knowledge of neighbors and the number of protective measures individuals take.

H_{13b}: There will be no relationship between integration in the community social network and the number of household protective measures taken.

Although people are more likely to join organizations of which their friends are members (Spaulding, 1966), some research has questioned the rootedness explanation of

community organization membership. In studying meso-level behaviors, both Hunter (1975) and Guterbock (1980) found no relationship between local ties and membership in local organizations or political activity.¹⁰ As for macro-level behaviors, Laumann (1969, 1973) found that reciprocated friendship pairs neither matched nor described accurately their friends on political views, party registration, or ideation.

Political behavior is the product of the dialectic between individuals and their surrounding culture (Hunter, 1975; Crenson, 1983) and those identifying with the particular culture are more likely to take action. Residents of a community may contribute to a community good even if they do not value the good significantly more than non-contributors do (Oskamp et al. 1991), or if there is question about the patrolling providing security.

H₁: Integration into the community will be associated with neighborhood association membership.

Network data will be used to examine the relationship between integration into the neighborhood and electoral behavior. Although Laumann (1969, 1973) found that reciprocated friendship pairs neither matched nor described friends' political views, party registration, or ideation,

¹⁰ Both Hunter and Guterbock studied organizations which required both time commitments and monetary contributions.

Burstein (1976) found that friendship ties may be more significant predictors than social and demographic characteristics in predicting voting behavior. Other factors which have been seen as significant, such as party affiliation (Hahn and Kamieneki, 1987), ideology (Converse, 1964), gender of voter (Courant, Gramlich, and Rubinfeld, 1980), and other sociodemographic factors (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, 1960) will be used as control variables. Because tax referenda do not receive as much publicity as candidate elections, there is considerably less discussion and influence among peers about their voting behavior. This should lead to less influence on each other's voting decisions.

H₅: There will be no relationship between integration into the community social network and electoral support for tax referenda.

Rational Choice Hypotheses

Lavrakas et al. (1981) stated that "citizens become involved in anti-crime activities not because of personal assessment of being at risk or any past experiences with victimization, but rather as part of their participation with formal voluntary associations within the community (p.3)." The rational choice perspective takes individual interests as given and examines incentives and constraints for actors. It explores coercive abilities of others in

the system and how others may influence actors' behaviors. Rational choice theory borrows from the psychological, stratification, and social network perspectives to develop an argument for support for security at the micro, meso, and macro levels. The psychological model contributes the value of the good to the equation. The stratification approach contributes the explanation that actors behave within the constraints of a system of like others and also form coalitions with that same group to procure public goods (Castells, 1977). The social network perspective views integration and rootedness as enhancing potential sanctioners' influence.

In the psychological model, **fear** is believed to be a salient variable predicting micro, meso, and macro security support. However, just as support for one kind of security is not necessarily related to support for another kind, the impact of fear on security practices is not constant at all levels. I expect fear to be a more salient predictor of action at the micro and macro levels, and a less salient predictor of support for security practices at the neighborhood organization (meso) level.¹¹ While interests

¹¹ Residents of neighborhoods with community crime watch programs who do not participate still have a lower risk of burglary than those in neighborhoods without similar programs (Lindsay and McGillis, 1986). By law, an officer on patrol cannot ignore specific homes, even if the officer is on private duty and the prospective victim does not

are taken as a given, attitudinal development is considered to be a complex process combining status, networks, options, and constraints. Rational choice theory views attitudes as intervening variables.

From the stratification perspective, actors are influenced differently by their relationships for each type of security concern. The study of a single, homogeneous neighborhood does not allow for the analysis of some racial and socioeconomic effects on the various dimensions of security. Also, because this study focuses on the household as the unit of analysis, the relationship between sex and security-related behaviors is not analyzed.¹² At the micro level, the effect of status characteristics on the adoption of practices related to security will be explained by fear of crime. Status characteristics will only have an indirect effect through fear of crime. At the meso level, status characteristics should have no effect on neighborhood association membership because neighborhoods are relatively homogeneous entities (Massey and Denton, 1993; Fischer, 1982). At the macro level, wealthy people are more likely not to want to spend on redistributive

contribute dues.

¹² I assume that a protective measure taken around the home benefits all members of the household, just as membership in the civic association covers households and not just individuals.

referenda. Too, residents with little trust in the local government are less likely to support tax increases for the criminal justice system because they are less likely to believe that government is capable or willing to address their concerns.

Social network variables should affect individual attitudes. However, I expect that there will be no effect of integration in the community social network on household security measures. Although balance theory (Heider, 1958; Newcomb, 1961) would predict that associates are likely to hold similar attitudes, Laumann (1973) showed that people did not necessarily match their friends in private decisions. Following Hechter (1987), visibility should be a key variable in explaining network effects. Behaviors must be visible in order to monitor the proscribed and prescribed behaviors and some type of relationship must exist for informal community sanctions to exist. Household and civic level measures are private level behaviors. Actions within the neighborhood are more visible and subject to monitoring.

H_{16a}: Household avoidance security measures will be explained almost entirely by fear of crime.

H_{16b}: Household preventive security measures will be explained almost entirely by fear of crime.

H₁₇: Neighborhood association membership will be explained by fear to a lesser extent than at micro and macro levels and integration in the neighborhood.

H₁₈: Security-related voting behavior will be explained by fear of crime and trust in the local government.

Data and Variable Description

Data

Data were collected, in face-to-face interviews, with 137 residents of a single neighborhood in Baton Rouge, Louisiana (see Appendix A). That neighborhood is referred to here by the pseudonym "Midtown." Because neighborhood of residence is a key variable affecting attitudes and actions related to community life (Crenson, 1983), the investigation of one homogeneous neighborhood in detail provides an appropriate context in which to test my hypotheses. Several important factors can be held constant including neighborhood history, cultural influences, race, education, and income. I use the Midtown neighborhood as a case study in order to test a stable, relatively homogeneous system of actors. A variety of methods are employed to illustrate the social context of neighborhood life.¹³

¹³This neighborhood is an older, established geographic area located within a homogeneous U.S. Census classified block group. It is composed of parts of two census tracts (see Appendix A). Residents of this area are part of a

The Midtown area is worthy of study because:

- a) It is a stable community that offers the opportunity for meeting and interacting with others.
- b) Residents of the area represent an important segment of the electorate with high voting participation in all types of elections.
- c) House values are mixed, resulting in variability in property tax liability among the area's residents.
- d) Residents of this area can afford to pay for private duty patrolling in their neighborhood.

The survey instrument included several questions about the respondents' household structure, and socioeconomic status, as well as sentiments about their neighborhood, social networks, personal and neighborhood security, public affairs, crime, and racial issues. Questions measuring fear of crime, social status, and social networks are key independent variables in the hypotheses.

The Midtown area is homogeneous with respect to race, income, and education (see Appendix A, Table A-3). The area is located in a census block group that is 99% non-Hispanic white, 0% black. Median income is well above that

homogeneous voting precinct. I have chosen this area to study because it is recognized as a neighborhood by most of its residents though the study area does not exist within a governmentally classified geographic region.

of city as a whole. Fewer than 1% of the residents are recorded as living below the poverty line, and no one in this block group is on public assistance (1990 U.S. Census). The median year in which the housing structure was built was 1953. In short, this area is an older, established neighborhood whose residents are white and middle class. However, due to its location near the city center, it is surrounded by less affluent minority neighborhoods with higher crime rates. In chapter three, I will give a detailed account of community characteristics based on survey responses.

Among collective crime-prevention programs, "neighborhood watch" programs are among the most common and most studied. The primary purpose of neighborhood watch is to promote surveillance of the neighborhood by residents, but effectiveness of this program is questionable. (Garofalo and McLeod, 1989). Also, because most neighborhood watch programs have no fees, dues, or time commitments, it is often difficult to study participation and commitment to the program (Garofalo and McLeod, 1989; Lewis et al, 1988). For this reason it is preferable to study residents' participation at the neighborhood level where there exist recorded contributions to the local civic association.

I conducted several interviews with founders and current leaders of this group. Ms. Jones, the leader of the group, was born and raised in the neighborhood and purchased her house in 1979. Along with a few friends and family members residing in the area, she decided to start an independent neighborhood security organization. Dues were established at \$30.00 a month for area schools and the synagogue and \$10.00 for the area's residents. The group began hiring off-duty patrols for two to four hours per day at a rate of \$10.00 per hour. In 1995, they paid \$12.00 an hour for four to six hours per day patrolling. This provision of security the only activity of the group. The police patrol the neighborhood in a marked car, stopping and questioning people they believe are not area residents.¹⁴ According to Ms. Jones, an officer once told her "we don't have a lot to do" and she replied "that's our goal." All of the civic association's budget goes toward police patrolling and as a group, they have no political opinions or goals. They have no regular meetings because attempts have produced very low turnout.

In addition to this neighborhood level program, I have chosen to analyze three recent tax referenda that targeted the municipal criminal justice system as the beneficiary of

¹⁴ During the interviewing process, I was stopped and questioned by the police at three different times.

the revenue. The first occurred in January, 1992, a sheriff's tax referendum that failed by a 3-to-1 margin. The East Baton Rouge law enforcement district tax was the only issue on the ballot that day. The tax proposed to supply \$7.4 million per year for 10 years, to pay for employee raises, pay off the office's deficit, allow for hiring new employees, and create an emergency surplus fund. Because the tax lacked specifics, groups across the political spectrum opposed this tax.

In July of 1992, the city of Baton Rouge proposed a property tax for the police and fire departments. The distribution of the tax was clearly outlined and publicized. Salaries would be raised and outdated equipment would be replaced. This tax was supported by the mayor, 11 of the 12 metropolitan council members, the AFL-CIO, major media outlets, and many other groups. The tax was opposed by a marriage of convenience consisting of the NAACP, Nation of Islam, and East Baton Rouge Parish Republican executive committee. Republicans fought the idea of the tax and the black community was angered over two recent police shooting deaths of an unarmed black youth and a retarded black man with a toy gun.

In October 1993, a third tax proposal was placed on the ballot. Sheriff Elmer Litchfield campaigned heavily for the tax and promised to open his budget to the public.

Litchfield promised to hire 65 new deputies, to reopen the 444-bed wing of the parish prison closed in 1992, hire another 19 officers for other areas of the department, and give the deputies a \$200-a-month raise and clerical workers \$100 more per month. If the tax referendum failed, \$1.6 million would be cut, forcing closure of 40 - 116 more prison beds. This referendum passed.¹⁵

Dependent Variables

Household security measures are analyzed individually as dependent variables and are grouped into indices. One index consists of avoidance behaviors and another of protective measures. Neighborhood participation is measured both by self-report and presence on a list of current dues-paying members of the Midtown Neighborhood Association (MNA). Support for civic-level security improvement is measured by the respondents' reported voting history on three tax referenda elections held in 1992 and

¹⁵ At the time of this referendum, Republican incumbent Elmer Litchfield appeared to be entrenched in his position as he sought a third term as East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff, facing Democrat Loyd Ingle as token opposition. With a few minor referenda on the ballot, this was the most publicized contest of a relatively unpublicized election day. Before becoming sheriff, Litchfield was a retired FBI agent. Ingle's only experience with the law seemed to be that he was booked three times (twice for suspicion of DUI, once for a fight in a bar). Ingle also received negative press earlier in the year when he was shot four times by his wife during an argument. I expected that only the most loyal Democrat would vote for him as sheriff.

1993. The index of avoidance measures¹⁶ consists of the responses to three survey questions with a yes or no response:

Do you ever avoid going out alone?

Do you ever avoid going out at night?

Do you ever avoid going some places in the city?

Responses to eight survey questions dealing with protective measures are used to construct a protective measure index.¹⁷

¹⁶ Cronbach's alpha for this three item scale is .617. A principal component analysis of 11 micro-level security measures creates this three term factor (eigenvalue = 1.64).

¹⁷ Cronbach's alpha for this scale is .517. It could be argued that this score is not very high. However, the nature of protective security measures vary. Further research should examine dimensions and determinants of avoidance and protective measures. Of significant factors created other than the three variable index of avoidance measures, I saw no "simple structure" (Hatcher and Stepanski, 1994) which these variables are related to the exclusion of others (such as the factor combination of leaving the television, radio, or lights on when out and purchasing a weapon for protection). Therefore, I have chosen to add the remaining household security variables as protective.

Since you have moved into your home, have you:

installed an alarm system?
installed dead bolts?
purchased a dog for protection?
installed a security fence?
left the tv, radio, or lights on when out?
purchased weapons for protection?
installed window locks or grates?

At the meso level, I will measure participation in community security by the record of dues collection kept by the treasurer of the Midtown Neighborhood Association. If a person had paid dues for at least six months out of the previous year, they were counted as a member.

At the macro level, I will analyze three separate responses to dichotomous questions that were asked on the survey. Turnout and voting choice are two distinct phenomena. For each of the three elections, I will measure support/opposition to the tax, with analysis focusing on the electoral decision.¹⁸

The questions were worded as follows:

¹⁸ The dimensions studied here were not significant predictors of electoral turnout. I have chosen not to interpret the absence of this effect.

Did you vote in the tax election for the sheriffs department this past October 16th?

If yes:
How did you vote?

If you remember, last year both the sheriff's department (January, 1992) and the city police department (July, 1992) had elections that would have raised property taxes in order to provide more funding.

Did you vote in the sheriff's tax election in January of 1992?

If yes:
How did you vote?

Did you vote in the police department's tax election in July, 1992?

If yes:
How did you vote?

Independent Variables

In addressing the psychological argument, one must acknowledge that measuring fear of crime is not simple. Ferraro and Lagrange (1987) reviewed the fear of crime literature and argued that different questions yield different results. Their work supported the validity of a question that is often included in the NORC General Social Survey:

Is there any area right around here -- that is,
within a mile -- where you would be afraid to
walk alone at night?

This question addresses fear within a boundary close to the individual's home.

Racial sentiment was recorded by the respondent's answer on a four-point scale of agree strongly, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, and disagree strongly to the statement, "Blacks have too little influence in the life and politics of Baton Rouge."¹⁹

¹⁹ Race, like security, is not a simple issue which can be measured perfectly by one variable (Black and Black, 1989). Responses to eight racial attitude variables were subjected to a principal component analysis using the value of 1.0 as prior communality estimates. The principal axis method was used to extract the components, followed by a varimax (orthogonal) rotation (Hatcher and Stepanski, 1994). Though the first three components displayed eigenvalues greater than 1 and scree tests suggested that the first three factors were meaningful, two of the factors failed to meet Hatcher and Stepanski's criteria of having at least three variables with significant loadings on the retained components. The remaining factor accounts for only thirty-three percent of the total variance.

Findings suggest that "racial attitudes" are not captured by a single variable or factor, but are products of a multi-level belief system. Blumer (1965) suggested three color lines:

- a) The outer color line supports basic human rights of public facility access and voting rights for people regardless of race.
- b) The intermediate color line measures the rights of individuals to reside in communities of their choice, equal employment opportunity, and fair access to schools.
- c) The inner color line measures access to friendship among races.

Numerous combinations of the variables that measure

My measures of status characteristics are limited. Due to the lack of variance in the community on several socioeconomic status variables, it is not possible to analyze income and race effects.²⁰ The analysis is therefore limited to assessing the effects of family living arrangements and education. The survey asks the number of children under age twelve living in the home. Education is measured as the number of years of schooling completed.

Tax liability was recorded from the East Baton Rouge property tax assessment roles. Midtown residents listed as having some property tax liability were recorded as liable, while those with a homestead exemption on record for all of their property were recorded as exempt.

racial attitudes provided scales with little internal consistency (alphas ranging between .29 and .41). Zero-order correlations show that the statement measuring black influence in the life and politics of Baton Rouge is significantly related to other measures representing the outer color line ("The police are too hard on blacks," "The courts are too hard on blacks") and the intermediate color line ("People have the right to refuse to sell their property to anyone they choose, black or white," "Most people would prefer to live in neighborhoods with people of their same race," "Would you personally prefer to live in a neighborhood that is 1) all white 2) mostly white 3) about half black and half white (and no respondent selected 4) mostly black 5) all black)."

²⁰ Four out of five residents reported more than \$ 30,000 a year and more than half earn more than \$ 45,000 a year. Because the highest income category reported was \$ 65,000 or above, there was little variance in the Midtown sample. There are no black residents in the area.

To measure social networks, I used a name generator - name interpreter sequence. Name generators set the boundary that is examined in a survey for the respondents' social networks (Marsden, 1987). Name interpreters elicit the characteristics of network members. I used the name interpreter that was used in the 1985 General Social Survey: "From time to time, people discuss important matters with other people. Looking back over the last six months - who are the people with whom you discussed matters important to you?" Both first and last names were elicited. Four other name generators were also used: "Just counting the adults, who are the people that normally live in this household? Not including the people who live here, what adult relatives do you or your husband/wife have in the Midtown area? Are there any people in the Midtown area that you would consider friends or close personal acquaintances? How about in the Baton Rouge area. Are there any you would consider friends or close personal acquaintances?"

Full names were given by 93 of the 137 respondents (sixty-eight percent). First names only or descriptions of associates (my sister, my friend, my neighbor) were given in 27 of the 137 cases (twenty percent). Twelve percent refused to complete this section or gave very sketchy information such as "mostly family" or "my friends."

The name interpreters asked respondents how long they have known each alter; whether each associate was a relative, whether each person lived in the household; the neighborhood, and the city. Next they were asked each associate's sex and race; their degree of "closeness;" whether they have visited the associate in the past six months; and whether they care for each other's homes when they are away (Fischer, 1982).

Integration into the community social network is measured by the number of associates listed that were recorded as living in the neighborhood. Because both first and last names are not needed for this measure, 120 (eighty-eight percent) of the respondents' questionnaires are usable for measurement of this dimension.

Trust in local government was measured on a three-point scale. Respondents were asked "How much of the time would you say you trust the local government? - most of the time, some of the time, almost never."

This chapter has outlined hypotheses on the determinants of various dimensions of security and proposed tests of the psychological, stratification, social network, and rational choice perspectives. In chapter three, I show that no single variable or perspective can completely explain household, community, and public provision of the good of security.

CHAPTER 3. ANALYSIS

Introduction

In this chapter, I begin by presenting descriptive statistics for the sample. Next I examine the relationships among the levels of security that are used as my three primary dependent dimensions. I then present descriptive statistics for the independent variables. Finally, hypotheses that derived from the psychological, stratification, social network, and rational choice perspectives are tested.

Sample Characteristics

This section describes the Midtown area as, a relatively homogeneous, older, stable, white, middle class neighborhood. I discuss social composition, commitment to the community trust, and political views before turning to attitudes on fear and violence. For purposes of comparing the Midtown survey sample with the city as a whole, I use a similar survey conducted by the Louisiana State University Center For Life Course and Population Studies. This survey was administered to a random sample of East Baton Rouge Parish residents (n=139) in October, 1994. That survey contained questions that parallel those used in the Midtown survey. In what follows, any reference to opinions or

characteristics of Baton Rouge as a whole should be construed as referring to this study unless noted.

The Midtown data come from a face-to-face survey conducted within each household during daylight hours. Respondents were selected by asking for "the person who spends the most time around the house." Women were therefore overrepresented in this sample, comprising sixty-four percent of the respondents as compared to the Baton Rouge telephone poll which was forty-nine percent female. Ninety-seven percent of the Midtown sample was non-Hispanic white while the Baton Rouge sample was seventy-three percent white. The average age was fifty-three, (ranging from twenty-six to one hundred), while the average respondent in the Baton Rouge poll was forty.²¹ The median household annual income range reported was between \$45,000 and \$60,000, well above the East Baton Rouge parish median income of \$27,224 (1990 U.S. Census) and the median income range of \$25,000 to \$35,000 for the Baton Rouge poll.²² Forty-five percent of the Midtown sample owns real estate

²¹ Median ages were thirty-seven years for Baton Rouge and forty-four for the Midtown area.

²² According to 1990 U.S. Census, this neighborhood lies within in a block group with a 1989 median household income of \$36,544. Less than one percent of the individuals in the Midtown sample live with incomes under the poverty line in contrast to the nine percent of East Baton Rouge Parish whites.

valued in excess of \$75,000 and are liable for parish property taxes. The median duration of neighborhood residence is fifteen years for Midtown residents as compared to five years for East Baton Rouge Parish as a whole.²³

Midtown residents are highly educated. Only two percent of the sample reported fewer than twelve years of formal education, while fifty-five percent report having 16 or more years of education (college and post-graduate degrees).²⁴ Only sixty percent of the respondents were married. The rest were single, divorced, or widowed. Thirty percent of the households contain children.

Residents reported a high degree of commitment to the Midtown neighborhood. Seventy-five percent said they would be very sorry to leave if for some reason they had to move away (ninety-eight percent said they would be either very or somewhat sorry to leave). In response to the question of whether Midtown residents considered their neighborhood to be "a real home" or "just a place where they happen to be living," ninety-six percent responded that they consider this neighborhood to be a "real home." This is

²³ All respondents in the Midtown survey lived in single family homes.

²⁴ Median education completed was fourteen years for Baton Rouge as a whole and sixteen years for the Midtown sample.

considerably higher from the sixty percent of East Baton Rouge Parish residents who considered their own neighborhood a "real home." Midtown residents are also optimistic about the community. When asked if they believed their neighborhood had "become a better place to live, stayed the same, or gotten worse in the past two years," twenty-five percent reported that the neighborhood has become a better place to live, while only five percent reported that the neighborhood had gotten worse.²⁵ Ten percent believe the neighborhood will be a better place to live two years from now, while only three percent believe that it will have gotten worse.

In response to a question on how many people in their neighborhood can be trusted, seventy-five percent stated that almost all residents can be trusted and twenty-five percent claimed that most residents can be trusted. Less than one percent of the sample reported that people from the neighborhood were responsible for most of the crime occurring in the Midtown neighborhood. Nearly ninety-eight percent of the Midtown residents surveyed stated that they believed that most crimes in the neighborhood are perpetrated by Baton Rouge residents from other

²⁵ Of the Baton Rouge sample, fourteen percent claimed that their neighborhood was a better place to live, sixty-seven percent said it was the same, and nineteen percent report that the neighborhood had gotten worse.

neighborhoods and almost two percent reported that most crimes in Midtown are committed by residents outside of Baton Rouge.

Seventy-four percent of Midtown residents claimed to know at least most of their neighbors by sight and sixty-three percent claimed to know at least most of their neighbors by name. While these items offer some indication of a potential sense of community, residents do not report high levels of intimate interaction. When asked how often they get together with neighbors for picnics or parties, only two percent said often and twenty-four percent said sometimes. A full seventy-four percent rarely or never socialize with their neighbors.

Residents of Midtown claim to be concerned with political issues.²⁶ Ninety-two percent are registered to vote and the precinct in which the Midtown neighborhood is

²⁶ Although most residents claim to be concerned with political issues, the Midtown Neighborhood Association is only involved with the provision of supplemental police patrolling. They take no official stand on any other issue. The work of Lavrakas et al. (1981) and Podolefsky and DuBow (1981) deals with crime prevention efforts within community organizations. The organization I studied does not exist for any reason other than crime prevention. Podolefsky and DuBow, Lavrakas et al., and the Reactions to Crime Project advocate the idea that most citizens participate in neighborhood based anti-crime programs as one aspect of their participation within the community and not because of fear of crime.

located consistently shows higher than average turnout.²⁷ Fewer than nine percent of the respondents claim to follow local government "only now and then" or "hardly at all." Half of the Midtown residents surveyed have written or spoken to their metropolitan council representatives or local leaders. As far as trust in the local government, twenty-five percent reported trusting the local government "most of the time," fifty-six percent "some of the time," and nineteen percent "almost never" trust the local government.²⁸ East Baton Rouge Parish as a whole appears to be slightly less trusting, with only fifteen percent trusting the local government "most of the time," forty-eight percent "some of the time," and thirty-seven percent "almost never."

Voters in this area may not be categorized as consistently supporting or opposing all tax millages for law enforcement. While seventy-two percent voted in favor of the 1993 measure that passed, fewer than half supported the 1992 measures that failed.

²⁷ Turnout for the precinct that contains the Midtown neighborhood is twice the city average in some elections.

²⁸ Trust may be a relative concept. Several respondents asked whether the local government excluded the state legislature and Governor. After the interviewer responded that this question was only about the city-parish government, most respondents indicated some level of trust.

While the Midtown area has many characteristics of a "conservative" neighborhood, political views are represented across the spectrum. The mean respondent score is 4.6 on a seven-point scale on which 1 represents extremely liberal and 7 represents extremely conservative. This score does not differ significantly from the score of 4.4 for Baton Rouge as a whole.

Attitudes on Fear and Violence

In the past two years, only two (1.5 percent) Midtown residents had been victimized by violent crime but nearly twenty percent have had some type of crime committed against their property. An additional ten percent claimed that others residing in their home had been victimized in the past two years. More than forty-four percent know others who have been victimized.

Table 3.1

Crime Victimization

Has been a victim of violent crime in the past two years	1.5%
Has been a victim of property crime in the past two years	19.7%
Has been a victim of other crime in the past two years	10.2%
Knows neighbors that were victimized by crime	44.2%

Respondents were then asked their general opinions concerning the safety of Baton Rouge. Eighty-three percent

of the sample agreed strongly or somewhat with the statement, "Crime is the most important issue facing us right now" (fifty percent agreed strongly; Table 3.2). However, fear of crime and perceptions of safety are not easily measured. Table 3.3 describes responses to several dimensions of fear. No respondent described the city of Baton Rouge as "very safe" and only one-third of the sample described the city as "fairly safe." In contrast, nearly ninety-six percent described the Midtown neighborhood as either "very" or "fairly safe," while eighty-eight percent of Baton Rouge as a whole described their neighborhood similarly. Just over ninety-six percent of Midtown residents (ninety-one percent of Baton Rouge) reported their home to be "very" or "fairly safe," while no Midtown residents (and only 4.3% of Baton Rouge residents) described their home as "not safe at all." Ninety-one percent believed themselves to be "very" or "fairly safe." Only twenty-eight percent stated that they ever worry about the safety of young children (under 12) playing outside around here (Table 3.4).²⁹

²⁹ Some of the respondents replying in the affirmative stated that they were primarily concerned about the safety of children playing in the street being hit by cars.

Table 3.2
Significance of Crime Issue

	Agree Strongly	Agree Somewhat	Disagree Strongly	Disagree Somewhat
Crime is the Most Important Issue	50.0%	32.8%	14.8%	2.3%

Table 3.3³⁰
Assessment of Area Safety

	Very Safe	Fairly Safe	Not Very Safe	Not Safe At All
Baton Rouge Safety	0.0%	34.8%	60.7%	4.4%
Neighborhood Safety	25.2%	70.4%	3.7%	0.7%
Home Safety	35.0%	61.3%	3.6%	0.0%
Personal Safety	25.9%	65.2%	8.1%	0.7%

Table 3.4
Fear of Crime

	Yes	No
Worry about safety of children playing in area	28.0	72.0
Afraid to walk alone in area at night	84.7	15.3

In sum, respondents feel they reside in a safe neighborhood in a dangerous city. Though the neighborhood is reported to be safe, most respondents believe that areas surrounding their neighborhood may be dangerous. Eighty-five percent of Midtown residents interviewed responded

³⁰ Among the 187 places in the United States with populations above 100,000, Baton Rouge was ranked the 8th most dangerous city in America, in terms of violent crime rates (Updegrave, 1994).

affirmatively to the questions: "Is there any area right around here--that is, within a mile--where you would be afraid to walk alone at night?" in contrast to fifty-two percent of the East Baton Rouge Parish sample.³¹

Table 3.5 lists affirmative responses to avoidance measures. Thirty-nine percent reported going out alone, nearly forty-three percent avoided going out at night, and eighty-eight percent avoided certain places in the city.³²

Table 3.5
Avoidance Measures

Avoid going out alone	38.8%
Avoid going out at night	42.5%
Avoid going certain places in the city	88.0%

Table 3.6 shows protective measures taken since moving into their home. Precautionary measures already on the home before they moved in were not included. Twenty-nine percent installed an alarm system, sixty-nine percent installed deadbolt locks on their doors, and twenty-one

³¹ This disparity in the samples may be at least partially explained by the overrepresentation of elderly and female respondents in the Midtown survey. However, it may be more likely that the difference in fear of surrounding areas comes from the location of the Midtown neighborhood near poor (and high crime) neighborhoods in the central city.

³² The Baton Rouge survey asked a question "Thinking about the neighborhoods in Baton Rouge, are there any you go out of your way to avoid driving through?" Sixty-four percent responded "yes."

percent purchased a dog for protection.³³ Most residents (seventy-one percent) installed outside lighting and fifteen percent installed a security fence. Four out of five respondents reported leaving a television, radio, or lights on when they go out. One out of six purchased a weapon for protection.³⁴ Thirty-six percent installed locks on their windows.

Table 3.6

Protective measures

Purchased an alarm system	29.2
Installed deadbolt locks	68.7
Has dog for protection	21.2
Installed outside lighting	70.5
Installed security fence	14.5
Leave TV, radio, or lights on when out	79.5
Purchased weapon for protection	16.2
Installed locks on windows	35.9

³³ Owning a dog for protection is a matter of definition. Some owners of small dogs claimed that the dogs aided in security, while other owners claimed that their dogs offered no security.

³⁴ Forty-one percent of Midtown residents reported owning a gun of some type. Thirty-nine percent of these gun owners reported that the gun was primarily for protection and thirty-one percent said that the gun was for both hunting and protection. While forty-nine percent of Baton Rouge as a whole reported gun ownership, only thirty-one percent of the gun owners claimed that the gun was primarily for protection and thirty percent for both hunting and protection. Though Midtown residents are slightly less likely to own a gun, they are more likely to own the gun for protection.

Turning to community-level security, Midtown Neighborhood Association records show that dues payment participation has fluctuated from fifty to eighty percent since the inception of the organization. In January of 1994, about seventy percent of households in the Midtown area paid dues while seventy-six percent of those surveyed had paid dues.³⁵

Macro-level security actions are indicated by voting behavior. Overall, this neighborhood is more supportive of the city's law enforcement agencies than the rest of the parish (city police and parish sheriff's office; Table 3.7). Only six percent of the Midtown residents disagreed somewhat and no one strongly disagreed with the statement, "the police and deputies generally do a good job in Baton Rouge," while nineteen percent of those sampled in the East Baton Rouge Parish survey disagreed somewhat or strongly. Only two percent of the Midtown residents disagreed strongly or somewhat with the statement that "the police and deputies generally do a good job in this neighborhood," while seventeen percent disagreed somewhat or strongly in the parish. Eighty-seven percent support (strongly or somewhat) increased revenue for local law enforcement

³⁵ Respondents were not significantly more likely to be MNA members than non-respondents (chi-square = 3.43, not significant at .05 level).

agencies. Eighty percent agreed strongly or somewhat that "more money needs to be spent on law enforcement in order to reduce the incidence of crime." Not only do residents of this neighborhood support the local law enforcement agencies, but they also show great support for the concept of the "neighborhood beat cop." Over two-thirds strongly agreed with the statement "it would be better if the same police officers patrolled this neighborhood all the time and the people knew who they were" (a total of ninety-three percent agreed strongly or somewhat to this statement).³⁶

When asked who is responsible for the crimes committed in the Midtown neighborhood, only 0.8 percent responded that it is residents in the neighborhood while over 99 percent reported that people from outside the neighborhood commit the crimes.

Racial attitudes are often difficult to measure. We inquired about opinions on several race-related issues. In opinions on racial fear, sixty-one percent of the respondents agreed strongly or somewhat with the statement that "most whites fear blacks," while only thirty-one percent agreed strongly or somewhat with the statement that

³⁶ The Midtown sample is similar to the city as a whole. Sixty-three percent agreed strongly and eighty-four agreed either strongly or somewhat having the same police patrolling their home neighborhood.

Table 3.7
Police Issues

	Agree Strongly	Agree Somewhat	Disagree Strongly	Disagree Somewhat
Police do a good job in Baton Rouge	38.1	56.0	6.0	0.0
Police do a good job in this neighborhood	52.2	45.5	2.2	0.0
More money should be spent on law enforcement	34.6	45.7	13.4	6.3
Better if the same police patrolled this area all the time	67.2	26.2	4.1	2.5
		More	Same	Less
Do police pay more, less, or same attention to this neighborhood as others		26.4	39.7	33.9
		Often	Some	Almost Never
How often do you see police in this neighborhood		33.1	25.6	41.3

"most blacks fear whites." Only thirty-three percent agreed with the statement that the government should not make any special effort to help minorities.

In political issues related to both race and crime, twenty-seven percent agreed that "the police are too hard

Table 3.8
Race-Related Opinions

	Agree Strongly	Agree Somewhat	Disagree Somewhat	Disagree Strongly
Most whites fear blacks	14.8	46.1	31.3	7.8
Most blacks fear whites	2.4	29.0	42.7	25.8
Govt. should not make special efforts to help minorities	8.6	24.2	45.3	21.9
Police are too hard on blacks	3.3	24.0	32.2	40.5
Courts are harder on blacks than whites	6.8	25.4	33.1	34.7
Blacks have too little influence in Baton Rouge	11.7	16.7	37.5	34.4
People can refuse to sell home to anyone they choose	46.6	29.6	11.5	12.2

on blacks" and thirty-two percent agreed with the statement that "the courts in this area are harder on blacks than they are on whites." Seventy-two percent of the respondents disagreed with the statement "blacks have too little influence in the life and politics of Baton Rouge." In a question dealing with property rights, 76 percent agreed with the statement that "people have the right to

refuse to sell their property to anyone they choose, black or white." ³⁷

Descriptive Statistics

Table 3.9 presents simple descriptive statistics for the dependent variables in the analysis. Residents average 1.7 of the three avoidance measures, 3.3 of the nine protective measures, and 5 of the 12 total household measures that could be taken (see Appendix A). At the neighborhood level, 75.6 percent of the eligible residents of the community paid membership dues for the civic association in January, 1994.³⁸ Though the first two tax referenda failed, fifty-eight percent of the respondents reported voting in favor of the first sheriff's tax referendum and fifty-five percent of the sample reported voting for the second (July, 1992). In contrast, eighty percent of the sample voted in favor of the sheriff's tax referendum (October, 1993), which passed by a two-to-one margin. In all three elections, Midtown's electoral support for the taxes exceeded the citywide outcome by about twenty percent. This discovery supports

³⁷ Some respondents disagreeing with this statement claimed that they disagreed with this statement only because there is a law forbidding this practice.

³⁸ I use the month of January, 1994, to indicate association membership because it is the midpoint of data collection.

Table 3.9
Simple Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables
{n=137}

	<u>Mean</u>	<u>std</u>
No. of avoidance measures	1.7	1.04
No. of protective measures	3.3	1.64
No. of household measures	5.0	2.11

Percentages

Paid neighborhood assn. dues	75.6%
Voted for the January 1992 sheriff's tax	58.0%
Voted for the July 1992 police tax	55.1%
Voted for the October 1993 sheriff's tax	80.0%

Wilson and Banfield's (1964) claim that more affluent areas are actually more likely than most other areas to support increased municipal taxes. Midtown residents were about twice as likely as residents of other areas to participate in these moderately low turnout elections.

Table 3.10 presents descriptive statistics for the independent variables to be used in testing the hypotheses. Though the neighborhood is more affluent than the city and parish averages, fifty-five percent are exempt from paying any parish property tax.

Table 3.10
Simple Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables

	Mean	Standard Deviation
<u>Demographic Percentages</u>		
Exempt from Parish Property taxes	55.3%	
<u>Non-Demographic Percentage</u>		
Afraid to Walk Alone in Area	84.7%	
<u>Non-Demographic Means</u>		
Number of Associates Living in Neighborhood	2.40	2.27
Black Influence Score (1=too little, 4=too much)	2.95	.99
Political ideology score (1=very liberal, 7=very conservative)	4.57	1.53
Trust in local government (1=most of the time, 3=almost never)	1.95	.66

An average of only 2.7 associates listed were residents of the Midtown neighborhood.³⁹ This does not mean that residents are isolates locked inside their homes, but that needs of daily living are often fulfilled outside of the neighborhood (Wellman, 1979; Wellman and Wortley, 1990). The average respondent disagreed somewhat with the statement that "blacks have too little influence in the life and politics of Baton Rouge."

³⁹ Marsden (1987) reports that the 1985 General Social Survey mean and mode are three associates listed by the respondent. The names generated by this study are focused more on those residing within the boundary of the Midtown neighborhood.

Analysis

Levels of Security

The first issue to be addressed is the question of whether various levels of security measures are substitutional or complementary. Does taking security precautions at one level reduce or increase the likelihood of support for security measures at other levels? An argument can be made that one type of security lessens the need for other types of security. This substitutional argument claims that participating in one level of security actually eliminates the necessity of participating in another level of security. A substitutional argument would lead to the expectation of negative relationships between micro, meso, and macro security measures. Alternatively, the complementary argument claims that some people value security more highly than others and, hence, the adoption of one type of security should be positively related to support for another type of security. If micro, meso, and macro security measures are all positively related, then these relationships support the complementary argument.

Correlations between indicators do not offer clear and consistent support for either argument. Contrary to the predicted direction of hypothesis #1 but supporting the substitutional argument, those residents taking more

security measures in and around their home are significantly less likely to support the tax referenda. However, residents taking a larger number of security measures are **more** likely to pay dues to the neighborhood association. There appears to be no significant relationship between membership in the neighborhood organization and support for the tax referenda.

Thus, there is partial support for the complementary argument. The data show a significant positive relationship between the number of individual/household security measures taken and paying Midtown Neighborhood association dues ($r = .245$, $p = .039$). This finding supports the complementary argument that dues paying is either complementary at all levels or dues paying is an individual level decision just as other individual/household measures.

Neither the complementary nor the substitutional argument presents a simple explanation of observed relationships between security practices. Nor does either provide a solution applicable to all combinations of levels. Micro and meso levels of security appear to be complementary, while together these are substitutional with respect to macro-level security.

Table 3.11 presents the zero-order correlation coefficients for variables used in suggesting a reversal of direction for the hypothesis stating that residents taking more security measures in and around their home will be more likely to support the tax referenda. Data from the first two elections show a strong negative relationship between the number of household security precautions and support for the tax referendum, while the third election (October, 1993) shows no significant relationship. The October 1993 election differs from the other two elections in that the city-parish government and the sheriff's office presented a well-organized public relations and advertising campaign that was absent in the previous two elections. The value of public relations and advertising is difficult to measure and will not be explored in this dissertation. Instead, I interpret this negative relationship in two out of the three elections as support for a substitutional account of the relationship between micro and macro security provision.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Voting participation was not significant in any of the three elections.

Table 3.11
Correlation Table of Household Security Measures and Tax
Referenda Vote

		X_1			
Household					
security measures	X_1	1.000	X_2		
Jan. '92 Vote	X_2	-.335**	1.000	X_3	
July '92 Vote	X_3	-.299**	.862**	1.000	X_4
Oct. '93 Vote	X_4	-.054	.611**	.421**	1.000

$^*p < .05$
 $^{**}p < .01$

Tables 3.12a, 3.12b, and 3.12c show that the association between paying MNA dues and support for each of the tax referenda is not significantly different from

Table 3.12a
MNA dues payment status by Vote in January, 1992 tax
referendum

		Pays Neighborhood Association Dues		
		No	Yes	
Vote in January 1992 Sheriff's Tax Election	For	8 66.67%	22 57.89%	30
	Against	4 33.33%	16 42.11%	20
		12	38	

$$\chi^2 = 0.292$$

$$\text{Probability } \chi^2 \approx .589$$

Table 3.12bMNA dues payment status by Vote in July, 1992 tax referendum

		Pays Neighborhood Association Dues		
		No	Yes	
Vote in July 1992 Police Tax Election	For	7 63.64%	22 62.86%	29
	Against	4 36.36%	13 37.14%	17
		11	35	

$$\chi^2 = 0.002$$

$$\text{Probability } \chi^2 = .963$$

Table 3.12cMNA dues payment status by Vote in October, 1993 tax referendum

		Pays Neighborhood Association Dues		
		No	Yes	
Vote in October 1993 Sheriff's Tax Election	For	10 83.33%	32 78.05%	42
	Against	2 16.67%	9 21.95%	11
		12	41	

$$\chi^2 = 0.158$$

$$\text{Probability } \chi^2 = .691$$

chance. Neither substitutional nor complementary explanations for security are supported by this finding.

Though paying neighborhood association dues and voting in municipal policing tax referenda are individual decisions, they represent contributions to collective goods that cannot be explained simply by placing a value on the good of security. Later in this chapter, I will explore other factors that may influence security provision at meso and macro levels.

Figure 1 illustrates observed relationships between security practices, showing that no simple conclusion can be made about relationships among all types of security measures. Residents taking more individual/household security measures are more likely to contribute to neighborhood protection. This supports the complementary approach to understanding security practices. On the other hand, the data show that individual level security provision is substitutional with respect to contributions to municipal security, since residents taking more security measures at the individual level are less likely to support tax referenda for law enforcement at the municipal level. These two seemingly opposite findings add to the complexity of the problem of security provision. Also, the lack of relationship between paying MNA dues and electoral support for the municipal level referenda supports the idea that more exploration must be done beyond offering the parsimonious theory that security provision is




Figure 1
Levels of Security

complementary at all levels. The problem of security cannot be understood through substitutional or complementary arguments alone.

Psychological

The psychological explanation of security provision views security as a product of the absence of fear. The hypotheses in this section examine the relationship between fear of crime and adoption of different types of practices related to security. Table 3.13 presents zero-order correlations between fear of crime and the number of avoidance measures taken. Hypothesis 4a predicted a strong positive relationship between fear of crime and the number of avoidance measures taken. Hypothesis 4b predicted a weak positive relationship between fear of crime and the

Table 3.13
Correlation Table of Fear of Victimization, Number of
Avoidance Measures Taken, and Number of Protective Measures
Taken

		X_1		
Afraid to walk alone	X_1	1.000		
			X_2	
Number of avoidance measures	X_2	.313**	1.000	
				X_3
Number of protective measures	X_3	.050	.209*	1.000

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

number of protective measures taken. Fear of crime is strongly related to the number of avoidance measures taken ($r = .313$, $p = .0002$) but there is no significant relationship between fear of victimization and the number of protective measures taken ($r = .050$, $p = .577$).

Hypothesis 5 predicted that fear of crime will not be related significantly to neighborhood association

Table 3.14
Crosstabulation of Fear of Victimization and Payment of MNA
Dues

		Afraid to Walk Alone at Night in Neighborhood		
		No	Yes	
Pays Neighborhood Association Dues	No	6 40.00%	13 20.63%	19
	Yes	9 60.00%	50 79.37%	59
		15	63	

$$\chi^2 = 2.466$$

$$\text{Probability } \chi^2 = .116$$

membership. Table 3.14 shows that fear of crime is not related significantly to payment of neighborhood association dues. Though the relationship is positive, the strength of the relationship is not statistically significant. I interpret this finding as the Midtown Neighborhood Association being viewed as a protective measure which is less influenced by fear of crime.

Tables 3.15a-c show that individuals who fear crime more strongly are not significantly more likely to support the security tax referenda. These findings contradict

Table 3.15a

Crosstabulation of Fear of Victimization and Vote in the January, 1992 Tax Referendum

		Afraid to Walk Alone at Night in Neighborhood		
		No	Yes	
Vote in January 1992 Sheriff's Tax Election	For	7 53.85%	40 58.82%	47
	Against	6 46.15%	28 41.18%	34
		13	68	

$$\chi^2 = .111$$

$$\text{Probability } \chi^2 = .739$$

Table 3.15b

Crosstabulation of Fear of Victimization and Vote in the July, 1992 Tax Referendum

		Afraid to Walk Alone at Night in Neighborhood		
		No	Yes	
Vote in July 1992 Police Tax Election	For	5 45.45%	38 56.72%	43
	Against	6 54.55%	29 43.28%	35
		11	67	

$$\chi^2 = .484$$

$$\text{Probability } \chi^2 = .486$$

Table 3.15c

Crosstabulation of Fear of Victimization and Vote in the
October, 1993 Tax Referendum

		Afraid to Walk Alone at Night in Neighborhood		
		No	Yes	
Vote in October 1993 Sheriff's Tax Election	For	9 64.29%	59 83.10%	68
	Against	5 35.71%	12 16.90%	17
		14	71	

$$\chi^2 = 2.587$$

$$\text{Probability } \chi^2 = .108$$

hypothesis 6, which predicted a positive relationship between fear and electoral support for the referenda.

Political ideology may have a stronger effect on anti-tax sentiment than law and order issues. Self-described conservatives were significantly more likely to vote against the first municipal tax referendum and were nearly so ($p = .102$) in the second election. While race has often been described as synonymous with politics in the South, Midtown residents' attitude about black influence in the life and politics of Baton Rouge is not significantly related to electoral decisions in the security tax against the first municipal tax referenda and were nearly so ($p = .102$) in the second election. While race has often been described as synonymous with politics in the South, Midtown

residents' attitude about black influence in the referenda. Therefore, describing opposition to the tax based on opposition to funding security in other neighborhoods may not be a viable explanation for opposition to the policing tax referenda.

Table 3.16
Correlation Table of Respondent's Political Ideology,
Racial Attitude, and Vote in Tax Referenda

		X_1				
Political Ideology	X_1	1.000	X_2			
Black Influence	X_2	.190*	1.000	X_3		
Jan. '92 Vote	X_3	.222*	.092	1.000	X_4	
July '92 Vote	X_4	.189	.034	.862**	1.000	X_5
Oct. '93 Vote	X_5	.094	.130	.611**	.421**	1.000

* $p < .05$
** $p < .01$

The psychological approach explains only a very small part of the problem of security. Fear of victimization fails to explain the adoption of protective security measures, membership in a neighborhood security association, and voting behavior on security issues. Fear of crime does seem to be related to the number of avoidance measures taken.

Stratification

Table 3.17 shows a lack of relationship between life course status characteristics and household security

measures. Hypotheses 8a, 8b, 9a, and 9b were not supported as correlation coefficients are very low, suggesting that being married or having children residing in the respondent's home apparently does not affect the number of

Table 3.17

Correlation Table of Family Status Characteristics, Number of Avoidance Measures Taken, and Number of Protective Measures Taken

		X_1			
Married	X_1	1.000		X_2	
Children	X_2	.270**	1.000		X_3
Number of Avoidance Measures	X_3	-.022	-.052	1.000	X_4
Number of Protective Measures	X_4	.009	.028	.209*	1.000

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

Table 3.18a

Crosstabulation of Respondent's Marital Status and Payment of MNA Dues

		Married Head of Household		
		No	Yes	
Pays Neighborhood Association Dues	No	9 28.13%	10 22.22%	19
	Yes	23 71.88%	35 77.78%	58
		32	45	77

$\chi^2 = 0.351$

Probability $\chi^2 = .554$

Table 3.18b
Crosstabulation of Presence of Children in the Home and MNA
Dues Payment

		Children Residing in Household		
		No	Yes	
Pays Neighborhood Association Dues	No	12 28.13%	7 22.22%	19
	Yes	45 71.88%	13 77.78%	58
		32	45	77

$$\chi^2 = 1.550$$

$$\text{Probability } \chi^2 = .213$$

avoidance or protective measures taken. These findings question the impact of altruistic fear on household level security actions.

There is also no significant relationship between marital status, the presence of children, or educational attainment, and membership in the community security organization (Tables 3.18a, 3.18b).

As hypothesis 10c predicts, there is no significant relationship between educational attainment and neighborhood association membership. However, I note the direction of education on payment of MNA dues ($r = -.15$). Education is not a life course status characteristic. It is a socioeconomic status characteristic. Those

respondents with more education are less likely to pay MNA dues.⁴¹

Hypothesis 11 predicted that there would be no relationship between tax liability and electoral support for the tax referenda. Residents with parish property tax liability are often more likely to vote against property taxes than those residents owning property valued at less than \$75,000. In this case, residents who are exempt from parish property tax were more likely to vote for the tax. Like much of the data, the first two elections that involved similar outcomes operate similarly (tables 3.19a and 3.19b). The January parishwide sheriff's election was voted down like the July citywide police election. Though the homestead exemption has a significant effect in both elections, it is interesting to note that the homestead exemption covers parish property taxes and does not exempt residents from city property taxes. All property owners are assessed the property tax millage in the July, 1992 election. Those with parish tax liability have higher tax assessments and greater city property tax liability.

⁴¹ Inferences drawn from this finding may be limited due to the lack of testing other socioeconomic status variables.

Table 3.19aCrosstabulation of Parish Property Tax Status and Vote in January, 1992 Tax Referendum

		Exempt from Parish Property Taxes		
		Yes	No	
Vote in January 1992 Sheriff's Tax Election	For	29	17	46
		74.36%	50.00%	
	Against	10	17	27
		25.64%	50.00%	
		39	34	

$$\chi^2 = 4.624$$

$$\text{Probability } \chi^2 = .032$$

Table 3.19bCrosstabulation of Parish Property Tax Status and Vote in July, 1992 Tax Referendum

		Exempt from Parish Property Taxes		
		Yes	No	
Vote in July 1992 Police Tax Election	For	26	15	41
		70.27%	45.45%	
	Against	11	18	29
		29.73%	54.55%	
		37	33	

$$\chi^2 = 4.427$$

$$\text{Probability } \chi^2 = .035$$

Though Midtown neighborhood residents are significantly more affluent than the average Baton Rouge community and more likely to support the municipal policing tax millages,

Table 3.19c
Crosstabulation of Parish Property Tax Status and Vote in
October, 1993 Tax Referendum

		Exempt From Parish Property Taxes		
		No	Yes	
Vote in October 1993 Sheriff's Tax Election	For	40 83.33%	26 78.05%	66
	Against	4 16.67%	7 21.95%	11
		44	33	

$$\chi^2 = 2.263$$

$$\text{Probability } \chi^2 = .133$$

residents with greater tax liability in the community are more likely to oppose the tax millages. The October, 1993 election does not show a statistically significant relationship but is in the predicted direction.

In analyzing the city and parish elections, there was no significant relationship between the life course status characteristics of being married or the presence of children in the home. Educational attainment shows a marginally significant positive relationship with support for the first tax election ($r = .211$, $p = .060$) and the second tax election ($r = .226$, $p = .048$).

Table 3.20a
Crosstabulation of Respondents Marital Status and Vote in
January, 1992 Tax Referendum

		Married Head of Household		
		Yes	No	
Vote in January 1992 Sheriff's Tax Election	For	25 66.67%	21 57.89%	46
	Against	22 33.33%	11 42.11%	33
		47	32	

$$\chi^2 = 1.210$$

$$\text{Probability } \chi^2 = .271$$

Table 3.20b
Crosstabulation of Respondents Marital Status and Vote in
July, 1992 Tax Referendum

		Married Head of Household		
		Yes	No	
Vote in July 1992 Police Tax Election	For	22 47.83%	20 64.52%	42
	Against	24 52.17%	11 35.48%	35
		46	31	

$$\chi^2 = 2.081$$

$$\text{Probability } \chi^2 = .149$$

Table 3.20cCrosstabulation of Respondents Marital Status and Vote in October, 1993 Tax Referendum

		Married Head of Household		
		Yes	No	
Vote in October 1993 Sheriff's Tax Election	For	37 74.00%	30 88.24%	67
	Against	13 26.00%	4 11.76%	17
		50	34	

$$\chi^2 = 2.541$$

$$\text{Probability } \chi^2 = .111$$

Table 3.21aCrosstabulation of Presence of Children in the Home and Vote in January, 1992 Tax Referendum

		Children Residing in Household		
		Yes	No	
Vote in January 1992 Sheriff's Tax Election	For	13 66.67%	33 57.89%	46
	Against	12 33.33%	22 42.11%	34
		25	55	

$$\chi^2 = 0.450$$

$$\text{Probability } \chi^2 = .502$$

Table 3.21bCrosstabulation of Presence of Children in the Home and
Vote in July, 1992 Tax Referendum

		Children Residing in Household		
		Yes	No	
Vote in July 1992 Police Tax Election	For	15 55.56%	27 54.00%	42
	Against	12 44.44%	23 46.00%	35
		27	50	

$$\chi^2 = 0.017$$

$$\text{Probability } \chi^2 = .896$$

Table 3.21cCrosstabulation of Presence of Children in the Home and
Vote in October, 1993 Tax Referendum

		Children Residing in Household		
		Yes	No	
Vote in October 1993 Sheriff's Tax Election	For	18 83.33%	49 78.05%	67
	Against	7 16.67%	10 21.95%	17
		25	59	

$$\chi^2 = 1.328$$

$$\text{Probability } \chi^2 = .249$$

Table 3.22
Correlation Table of Respondents Education and Vote in Tax
Referenda

		X_1			
Education	X_1	1.000	X_2		
Jan. '92 Vote	X_2	.211	1.000	X_3	
July '92 Vote	X_3	.226*	.862**	1.000	X_4
Oct. '93 Vote	X_4	.093	.611**	.421**	1.000

*p<.05
 **p<.01

While life course status characteristics do not appear to be related significantly to security provision, socioeconomic status characteristics merit further study. However, the effect of socioeconomic status is not easy to determine owing to the homogeneity of the neighborhood. Status characteristics of neighborhoods are related to differences in neighborhoods' abilities to organize and respond to crime (Skogan, 1990).

The Midtown neighborhood is more affluent than most other neighborhoods in the city and parish, supporting an ongoing neighborhood protection program and showing greater than average support for municipal policing tax referenda. The socioeconomic status argument of Wilson and Banfield also receives some support from the finding that more educated respondents are more likely to pay MNA dues and support increased taxes for municipal policing

improvements. However, socioeconomic status is not a consistent explanation owing to the negative relationship between tax liability and support for the same tax referenda.

Social Networks

Surprising results were found in examining the relationship between Midtown resident's neighborhood networks and household security provision. Better integrated residents are more likely to associate with their neighbors. Hypothesis 13a predicted that individuals who were more integrated into the community would take fewer avoidance measures, while hypothesis 13b predicted no relation between integration and number of household protective measures. An individual's network size is measured by the number of associates in the area listed in response to social network questions. Network size is a dimension of range (Campbell, Marsden and Hurlbert, 1986), or a measure of access to potential resources and integration. The larger the network the more potential resources.

Integration is not related to the number of avoidance measures taken ($r = -.001$, $p = .994$). This may be a product of opposing causal mechanisms. The safety of familiarity within an area and the knowledge of neighborhood gossip about crime victimization may work in

opposite directions to cancel any overall effects of integration. However, the degree of interpersonal integration into the community social network is related to the number of protective measures taken. The more integrated a community resident is, the fewer protective measures they take ($r = -.253$, $p .007$). Though some may argue that residents less integrated in the community are more likely to take protective measures because limited knowledge of the area increases uncertainty and fear (Warr, 1990), fear is not related significantly to the number of protective measures taken. Instead, I suggest that less integrated individuals are less likely to use their neighbors as security resources. Trust in neighbors leads to less reliance on other forms of protection.

Table 3.23

Correlation Table of Number of Associates in Area Listed by Respondent, Number of Avoidance Measures Taken and Number of Protective Measures Taken

		X_1			
Number of Associates in Area	X_1	1.000			
			X_2		
Number of avoidance measures	X_2	-.001	1.000		
				X_3	
Number of protective measures	X_3	-.253**	.209*	1.000	

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

Though I expected to find that integrated residents would be more likely to contribute to their neighborhood association, the data show no significant relationship between integration in the community social network and paying MNA dues ($r=.085$). The MNA is not composed primarily of individuals with friends in the neighborhood. Hypothesis 15 predicted no relationship between integration and electoral support for the tax referenda. This hypothesis is supported. Integration in the community does not lead to support for, or against municipal policing referenda.

Table 3.24
Correlation Table of Number of Associates in Area Listed by
Respondent, Payment of MNA Dues, and Vote in Tax Referenda

	X_1					
Number of Associates in Area	X_1	1.000	X_2			
Pays MNA Dues	X_2	.085	1.000	X_3		
Jan. '92 Vote	X_3	.020	.076	1.000	X_4	
July '92 Vote	X_4	.067	.007	.862**	1.000	X_5
Oct. '93 Vote	X_5	.095	.055	.611**	.421**	1.000

* $p < .05$
 ** $p < .01$

Rational Choice

Multivariate analysis is used to examine the extent to which psychological, stratification, and social network

factors affect support for each level of security. First, micro-level security practices are considered, followed by multivariate models for community and municipal security actions. Table 3.25 shows that fear of victimization is related significantly to the avoidance index while other variables are not significantly related to avoidance.

Table 3.25
Regression of Avoidance Measures on Selected Variables

Independent Variable	Unstandardized Coefficient	Std. Error	Prob > T
Intercept	3.41	0.81	0.001
Walk alone at night	0.73**	0.27	0.008
Trust local govt.	-0.22	0.15	0.126
Black influence	-0.12	0.10	0.250
Married	-0.03	0.21	0.895
Children in home	-0.06	0.24	0.796
Education	0.02	0.04	0.601
# assoc. in area	0.01	0.04	0.796
Respondent's age	0.03	0.04	0.496

R = .151

F = 2.106

Prob > F .043

Variance inflation factor coefficients are all below 1.5 suggesting no significant collinearity problem among independent variables.

* p < .05

** p < .01

Table 3.26 presents a regression of the index of protective measures on selected independent variables. While adding a few more variables could allow the multivariate model to approach a higher level of

significance, I present a simple model for two reasons. First, this model presents a direct comparison to the analysis of avoidance measures taken. Second, with a small number of cases, assumptions made on any finding with a larger number of independent variables would be questionable. While fear of victimization affects the number of avoidance measures taken, fear is not related to the number of protective measures taken.

One relationship that merits further study is the negative association between the number of neighbor-associates and the number of protective measures taken. This zero-order relationship remains after controlling for the other exogenous factors in the multiple regression model: those residents listing more neighbors as associates took fewer protective measures. The relationship between fear of victimization and number of protective measures taken remains insignificant. This lack of relationship leads me to question the effect of the neighborhood social network on protective security measures. Where Skogan (1977) claimed that integration into the neighborhood leads to greater fear of crime through increased neighborhood gossip and knowledge about crimes committed in the neighborhood, I claim that fear of victimization is not a mediating effect in the integration - security relationship.

Table 3.26

Regression of Protective Measures on Selected Variables

Independent Variable	Unstandardized Coefficient	Std. Error	Prob > T
Intercept	12.50 ^{**}	1.33	0.001
Walk alone at night	-0.28	0.44	0.532
Trust local govt.	-0.34	0.24	0.163
Black influence	0.07	0.17	0.681
Married	0.19	0.34	0.573
Children in home	-0.48	0.40	0.233
Education	0.06	0.07	0.379
# assoc. in area	-0.15 [*]	0.07	0.034
Respondent's age	0.02	0.01	0.120

$R^2 = .134$

$F = 1.746$

Prob > F .099

Variance inflation factor coefficients are all below 1.5 suggesting no significant collinearity problem among independent variables.

^{*} $p < .05$

^{**} $p < .01$

Because the model analyzing payment of MNA dues is not significant (F Value = 0.466, $p = .890$), its results cannot be interpreted. Controlling for several variables in the multiple regression model duplicates the failure of zero-order analysis which failed to show any significant relationship between paying MNA dues and any variable in this study. I find no support for the hypothesis that fear of victimization and integration in a social network of neighbors contributes to the maintenance of community organizations.

Table 3.27
Logistic Regression of Association Membership on Selected
Variables

Independent Variable	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Prob > Chi-Square
Intercept	-2.98	3.20	0.352
Walk alone at night	-0.72	0.84	0.390
Trust local govt.	-0.04	0.57	0.950
Black influence	0.10	0.37	0.798
Married	-0.45	0.86	0.600
Children in home	1.40*	0.77	0.068
Education	0.13	0.15	0.379
# assoc. in area	0.03	0.14	0.849
Prop. tax exemption	-0.02	0.28	0.957
Cons. Pol. ideology	-0.87	0.76	0.249

9 degrees of freedom
-2 Log Likelihood Chi-Square for
Covariates = 31.11 (p < .001)
* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01

Once again, relationships among variables predicting support for each of the three tax referenda are similar in most respects. Fear of victimization has a near-significant effect on voting decisions in the October 1993 election but not on decisions in the other elections. Trust in local government also yields ambiguous results. Though electoral support for the January and July elections are strongly related, their relationship with trust in local government differs as trust in government appears to be a more salient issue in the sheriff's elections (January 1992 and October 1993) than the city police election (July 1992).

Education shows a marginal or significant positive relationship in each model. However, I must note that the variability in socioeconomic dimensions such as education is low. In analyzing the tax votes, I added one variable, property tax exempt status, to each of the models, and eliminated respondent's age, which showed no significant relationship in voting for the referenda. Property tax liability is significant in two out of three elections. The positive coefficient for property tax liability indicates that those who are tax exempt are more likely to vote in favor of increased taxes.

Table 3.28
Logistic Regression of Vote in January 1992 tax referendum
on Selected Variables

Independent Variable	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Prob > Chi-Square
Intercept	4.09	3.39	0.228
Walk alone at night	0.60	0.02	0.553
Trust local govt.	1.82***	0.66	0.006
Black influence	-0.09	0.37	0.809
Married	1.55	1.05	0.139
Children in home	-1.30	0.82	0.110
Education	0.35**	0.17	0.039
# assoc. in area	0.02	0.14	0.902
Prop. tax exemption	1.68**	0.77	0.030
Cons. Pol. ideology	-0.55	0.34	0.105

9 degrees of freedom
-2 Log Likelihood Chi-Square for
Covariates = 31.11 (p < .001)
* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01

Other variables in the models do not aid in explaining voting behavior. Life course status characteristics of

marriage and children residing in the home offer no predictive value. The neighborhood network variable is

Table 3.29
Logistic Regression of Vote in July 1992 tax referendum on
Selected Variables

Independent Variable	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Prob > Chi-Square
Intercept	-1.35	2.93	0.646
Walk alone @ night	0.43	0.93	0.642
Trust local govt.	0.15	0.45	0.737
Black influence	-0.05	0.33	0.886
Married	-0.08	0.73	0.918
Children in home	0.20	0.67	0.767
Education	0.34**	0.15	0.021
# assoc. in area	-0.16	0.14	0.272
Prop. tax exemption	1.62**	0.66	0.015
Cons. Pol. ideology	-0.03	0.24	0.886

9 degrees of freedom
-2 Log Likelihood Chi-Square for
Covariates = 17.59 (p = .040)
* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01

Table 3.30
Logistic Regression of Vote in October 1993 tax referendum
on Selected Variables

Independent Variable	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Prob > Chi-Square
Intercept	3.69	4.16	0.376
Walk alone @ night	2.10*	1.13	0.063
Trust local govt.	1.54*	0.83	0.065
Black influence	0.04	0.47	0.928
Married	-1.33	1.23	0.277
Children in home	-1.00	0.94	0.286
Education	0.40*	0.21	0.054
# assoc. in area	-0.15	0.17	0.391
Prop. tax exemption	1.42	0.92	0.123
Cons. Pol. ideology	0.38	0.34	0.265

9 degrees of freedom
-2 Log Likelihood Chi-Square for
Covariates = 19.52 (p = .021)
* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01

also unrelated to voting decisions. Opinions on black influence in government are insignificant and conservative political ideology loses its zero-order significance when placed in a model with other control variables.

Discussion

Analysis of Midtown residents' survey responses supports my claim that security provision is not a simple matter of complementarity or substitutionality. Though security may be perceived as freedom from threat, fear of victimization is not related significantly to support for, or adoption of several types of security measures. At the household level, fear of victimization influences avoidance measures but is not related to the number of protective measures taken. Adoption of a greater number of protective measures is related to knowing more neighbors.

The major puzzle is the absence of any significant associations with Midtown Neighborhood Association dues paying. Possibly, the structure of the organization creates a set of influences that are unique from that of other organizations. The recent growth of organizations which require monetary contributions and no time commitment is a field which deserves more study (Putnam, 1995).

Electoral support for the municipal property tax millages varies slightly across the three elections,

however, I find that life course status characteristics such as education and property tax liability are be related to electoral decisions.

Overall, the psychological approach to understanding security contributes to understanding micro-level avoidance behaviors, the social network perspective contributes to understanding micro-level protective behaviors, and the stratification approach aids in understanding the macro-level municipal tax referenda voting behaviors. Rational choice theory, which is designed to explain collective goods provision through a combination of psychological, social network, and stratification factors, fails to explain the meso-level behavior of membership in the Midtown Neighborhood association.

CHAPTER 4. CONCLUSION

Introduction

Fear of crime is significantly related to individuals' personal avoidance measures. Having a greater number of associates in the neighborhood was related to taking fewer protective measures in and around the home. No variables were significantly related to support for contributions to the community crime-prevention organization other than a positive relationship between household measures and dues payment. Trust in local government, educational attainment, and tax-exempt status explains support for the tax millages.

In this chapter, I argue that security is not a simple concept. The primary argument of this dissertation is that security is a multi-level construct, and not a single variable. This multi-level construct has led numerous researchers to describe only a part of the problem of security. First, I will review the findings of this study which confirm that different variables influence various types of action which are taken to provide security. The psychological, stratification, social network, and rational choice approaches all fall short of presenting a unified explanation of all levels of security and the free rider problem. I present a modified interpretation of rational

choice theory that incorporates the concept of trust as a necessary condition for understanding security and the free rider problem. I conclude this chapter with a summary of this dissertation, acknowledging this study's limitations and describing ways these ideas may be incorporated in the design of public policy.

People react to crime in individualized ways and the relationship between micro, meso, and macro level security behaviors cannot be described exclusively substitutional or complementary. A substitutional effect is found in the inverse relationship between security related measures in and around the house and support for municipal policing tax referenda. However, a complementary effect was observed between micro and meso levels: residents who take more household security measures are more likely to pay dues to the neighborhood association. This complementary relationship between support for security measures in the home and community is not surprising. Security at home and in the neighborhood is a more immediate concern than other areas of the city (Warr and Stafford, 1983). The complementary relationship between household and neighborhood is one of propinquity, whereas the substitutional relationship between household and municipal government is one of distance.

None of the theoretical approaches succeeds in explaining all levels of security related behavior. Responses to crime can only be understood as a combination of individuals' crime-related concerns, the social and cultural context of the neighborhood, and the social and cultural context of the metropolitan area as a whole.

Review of Results

Psychological Approach

The psychological approach explains only one aspect of the problem of security. Fear is strongly related to individual avoidance measures but fails to explain individual protective measures, contributions to the neighborhood association, and electoral support for the first two policing-related tax referenda. Fear of crime is associated significantly with voting behavior in the successful tax referenda election.

Stratification Approach

Characteristics related to "traditional home and neighborhood life," such as marital status and the presence of children in the home are not related to adoption of any security practices.⁴² Tax liability predicts opposition to

⁴² Length of residence in the neighborhood was also not related to participation at any level. This finding casts doubt on the generalization that longer term residents of the neighborhood are more likely to build and support neighborhood institutions and promote stability (Kasarda and Janowitz, 1974). Stability of a neighborhood may just

the tax referenda. Though education is not significantly related to membership in the community association, there is cause for further study of its relationship with security. Perhaps those with higher education were more likely to oppose the tax referenda, but this may be because they were more likely to own property that was not covered by the homestead exemption. Socioeconomic status may be a factor in the adoption of security measures. Those residents with city property tax liability were more likely to oppose all three tax referenda. The survey did not capture significant income variability among Midtown neighborhood residents.⁴³

Though citizens with conservative political ideologies are believed to have stronger anti-tax sentiments, crime

be an artifact of socioeconomic status. While length of residence positively affects a person's involvement in the social life of the neighborhood (Lewis and Salem, 1986; Sampson, 1988), I found that length of residence in the neighborhood was positively related to paying MNA dues ($r = .29$, $p = .02$) in a zero order relationship. This finding does not persist when controlling for other variables in the multiple regression analysis. Adding length of residence to the multiple regression models significantly improved the fit for the number of avoidance measures taken, but did not meaningfully contribute to models analyzing the number of protective measures and all of the tax referenda. Though adding length of residence in the neighborhood may have improved the fit of the model analyzing contributions to the MNA, this model does not approach significance (prob. $F = .37$).

⁴³ Approximately 90% of the sample had household incomes above average for East Baton Rouge Parish.

and security-related issues are also salient issues for conservatives. The multivariate analyses in chapter three showed no relationship (controlling for other variables) between political ideology and vote in the tax referenda.⁴⁴

Though race has traditionally been called one of the most influential factors in Southern politics (Key, 1949; Black and Black, 1989; Carmines and Stimson, 1989), there is no relationship between a measure of racial beliefs and support for the policing tax referenda.⁴⁵

Social Network Approach

The social network perspective claims that relations between residents influence behavior. DuBow et al. (1979) claimed that the relationship between social integration and collective response is the single most important factor in the study of security. However, social integration

⁴⁴ One complaint about the nature of policing in East Baton Rouge Parish was voiced several times. The city police and parish sheriff's deputies are often publicly criticized for wasting money through duplicating services. Several survey respondents recommended that the police services be consolidated. However, while this argument is supported by many, an argument can be made for not consolidating the police and sheriff's office. Larger departments are not more cost efficient. Several researchers have argued that service delivery is less efficient and per capita costs of police services are significantly higher in urban areas than suburban areas (Ostrom and Parks, 1973; Bish and Ostrom, 1979; Ostrom et al. 1973).

⁴⁵ Though race related attitudes are difficult to measure, substituting other race related attitudes in the multiple regression model yielded similar (non-significant) results.

affects only some types of security measures. When integration of the community is measured by the number of friends in the community, there is no relationship with the number of avoidance measures taken, but there is a significant relationship with the number of protective measures taken. Residents listing more neighbors as associates took fewer security measures. Danger comes from the unknown.

However, the findings do not support Podolefsky and DuBow's (1981) idea that group membership is linked to affective ties among neighbors. Those residents listing more associates residing in the neighborhood were not significantly more likely to take any type of action other than taking fewer protective measures. Contributions to the neighborhood organization cannot be explained as prescribed behavior from other residents. There appears to be no significant relationship between embeddedness in neighborhood life and voting behavior.

Rational Choice Approach

Because each dimension of security has a unique set of determinants, I suggest that rational choice theory provides the best explanation of security provision. The psychological approach fails to explain contributions to collective action. Tests of the stratification and social network approaches also fail to demonstrate a relationship

between constraints and collective action related to security. Rational choice theory argues that actors in the system attempting to maximize their own profits from the costs and benefits of each security related action. This argument requires two assumptions: 1) Utility differs at micro, meso, and macro levels. 2) Trust in others is more influential than personal contact.

Neither Hechter's nor Coleman's ideas are supported because they do not account for utility differences among micro - macro levels and they misinterpret the concept of trust. I argue that trust in government has two aspects: 1) Citizens must believe that their tax dollars are not being squandered. 2) Citizens expect that others will contribute.

Familiarity is not trust (Luhmann, 1988). Participating in the MNA requires more than confidence that the money will go to pay patrolling officers. Contributions are given in the spirit of trust that others will contribute.⁴⁶

The free rider problem is not solved by familiarity, but by trust. Trust is a "we" feeling that may be developed through interpersonal exchange, but is also

⁴⁶ One person's contribution would pay for less than one hour of patrolling each month for the entire neighborhood. The accumulation of contributions fund more effective patrolling.

produced by reputation (Putnam, 1993). Status characteristics are cues to trustworthiness. Newcomers to the community may purchase their homes in a community based on its reputation even though they do not know their neighbors.⁴⁷ Trust in institutions may be garnered through public relations campaigns.⁴⁸ Participation depends on trust that the services will be delivered at a fair cost. Collective behavior may be studied as a rational process.

DeTocqueville discussed "enlightened self-interest," or self-interest, properly understood. Trust is the linkage of enlightened self-interest with the value of the good. Empirical tests of rational choice approaches lack an understanding of self-interest. I believe that some of the unexplained phenomenon of rational choice results from the lack of understanding of actors' constraints. The character and circumstances of self-interest change in trusting environments (Putnam, 1993). Because of the

⁴⁷ I observed that residents newer to the neighborhood trust their neighbors and believe that crime comes from outside the neighborhood, even though they have not participated in a system of neighborly exchange. They lack repeated exchanges but still trust.

⁴⁸ Luhmann (1988) argues that trust is vital in personal relations, but not functional systems like government. I disagree, trust is very important in government. Mistrust and unequal taxation are themes of the popular political commentator Rush Limbaugh and one source of the meteoric rise of the right wing in mid-1990's American congressional politics, just as Huey Long and Edwin Edwards' populism was strongly supported by the electorate.

systemic nature of rational choice theory, all hypotheses were tested in multiple regression models which control for other factors. Fear of walking alone at night was the sole significant variable related to the number of avoidance measures taken. In the model analyzing the number of preventive measures taken, the number of associates in the area listed by a resident, the fewer preventive measures they are likely to take. Needs are situational. Residents with knowledge about their neighbors are more likely to spot suspicious occurrences and sense a greater number of people looking after their homes. I find no significant variable related to paying dues in the Midtown Neighborhood association.

Analysis of each of the three tax referenda yield similar, but not identical, results. Property tax liability is significant in two out of the three elections. Those residents owning property valued below the homestead exemption were more likely to support the tax millages. Education is significant. Residents with higher educational attainment were more likely to support the tax referenda. My first inclination was to check the relationship between education and property tax liability. These two variables are not related ($r = -.003$, $p = .970$). Instead, just as educated respondents present racial beliefs through more publicly accepted ways, I claim that

the most educated citizens exert their political influence through the electoral process. An educated person's protest takes place in the voting booth.

While trust in the local government was significant in the first election only, note that fear of walking alone at night is not significant in the first two elections but was significant in the third election. The third tax referendum differed was unique from the previous two in that the government mounted a large scale public relations campaign, explaining to the public exactly where the money would go. It would fund small raises for employees of the sheriff's office and allow for the operation of 144 more beds in the parish prison. This disclosure may have generated trust among the electorate and was a key factor in converting previously skeptical voters into supporters for the tax increase. This third election was also held in 1993, more than one year after the two tragic shootings of the unarmed black men.⁴⁹

While Logan and Molotch (1987) propose that wealthier neighborhoods "work within the system," what we may be seeing is segregation leading to separate types of security. The MNA provides itself with police protection.

⁴⁹ The third tax referenda used a public relations campaign which focused on the slogan "lock 'em up." This slogan presented a simple understanding of the problem that East Baton Rouge Parish needed to enhance its jail space.

There is no organized political effort to procure more police for their own area (other than MNA protection), nor is there a struggle with less affluent areas (finger pointing, allegations that other neighborhoods get all the police). The MNA does not mobilize against the government. There is little evidence that Midtown residents believe they are struggling with other areas for more police patrolling because overall people are satisfied with the police. Few residents claim that other areas of the city receive a disproportionate amount of patrolling.⁵⁰

Theoretical Implications

While trust is a property of a system, behavior may be based on the value actors perceive in the exchange. While trustworthiness may encourage utilitarian actors to behave in a certain manner, there is no incentive for actors to invest more than the projected gain regardless of the social capital in the relationship (Hardin, 1992).

Trust relationships and dependencies vary at each level of security. At the individual level, security is gained by trust in others and faith that they will not be harmed. Taking an avoidance action is based on each individual's judgement of the situation. This dissertation supports Skogan and Maxfield's (1981) finding that

⁵⁰ Only 34% of the respondents believed that the police paid less attention to Midtown than Baton Rouge as a whole.

avoidance follows fear as assessed by individual actors. Protective behaviors are related to trust in the environment around home. Neighbor trust is related to individual protective measures. Knowing the area reduces the field of the unknown which provides a greater feeling of security (Warr 1990; Hunter and Baumer, 1982; Skogan and Maxfield, 1981).

No variable is related to contribution to the Midtown Neighborhood Association. When asked about how the MNA succeeds, the most common response was that "people must be willing to pay their dues." There is no formal mechanism to create and maintain trust in the neighborhood. Trust is difficult to generate at this level and is considered a primary factor in the difficulty of beginning and maintaining successful community organizations.

In explaining the success of tax referenda for law enforcement, trust in government is essential. The taxpayers want to believe that tax dollars will be used for effective programs that are distributed and paid for in an equitable manner. Whether the government does enough or not enough for security, whether it spends money wisely or not, is a political debate that yields little fruit. The people speak as a collective through the electorate, as neighbors, and in the actions they take. United States

citizens place a great deal of trust in politicians through its representative democratic system.

Familiarity is a key issue in security. Neighbors familiar with the area may notice odd occurrences in the area, and are more likely to report suspicious actions. Residents strongly supported the idea of having the same officers patrol the neighborhood throughout the year.⁵¹ One resident told of a story when a police officer thwarted a burglary attempt at her home because he noticed a strange car in the driveway. However, I suggest that familiarity does not create the "we" feeling which encourages contributions to the MNA.

Limitations of the Study

First, I must address the nature of the area studied. Urban life is unique from other areas in that it provides several alternatives for its residents (Fischer, 1982). Rural communities may not organize to provide patrolling, nor can they easily watch over their neighbors homes. Also, though urban areas are made up of diverse populations which cut across all social classes, the population studied for this dissertation is a homogeneous, white, middle class community in a southern metropolitan area. The level of

⁵¹ Sixty-seven percent strongly agreed with the statement "It would be better if the same police officers patrolled this neighborhood." Ninety-three percent agreed at least somewhat.

homogeneity allows for study beyond individual attributes of actors and facilitates analysis of a system, *ceteris paribus*.

Definitions of fear of crime vary with each conceptualization, potentially leading to different results (LaGrange and Ferraro, 1989). Designing indices of avoidance and protective measures was a process of constant testing, retesting, adding variables, subtracting variables, and compromises. Using these indices may obscure the understanding of individual security practices such as gun ownership.

This dissertation offers no concrete solution to understanding contributions to the Midtown Neighborhood association. It is difficult to measure the value of each security measure for each individual. Those residents in the area not contributing to the MNA do not feel more or less safe ($X^2 = 0.877$, $p = .645$), therefore, I cannot say that the MNA provides a welfare good (Rich, 1980a).

Festinger et al., (1950) claimed that group membership may offer rewards in just belonging, rather than utilitarian benefits. However, though deference goods are more likely to operate in homogeneous communities (Keller, 1968; Almy, 1975), people more integrated into neighborhood life are not more likely to contribute to the MNA. Even though the MNA is the provider of supplemental security and

on the whole people feel good about the neighborhood and the MNA, there is competition for the security dollar outside of the neighborhood level.

Trust is a difficult concept to measure. Though repeated exchange may produce a spirit of trust (Coleman, 1990a), this spirit of reciprocity is difficult to measure (Putnam, 1993). The "we" feeling is a subjective evaluation based on personal judgements. Social networks do offer support but also may act as burdens (Kilburn, 1996). More empirical research should be done understanding neighborhood cultural influence on residents' actions in neighborhoods. Because the ability to mobilize and create a public good may depend on tie structure (Granovetter, 1973; Crenson, 1978), further research should go beyond the existence of ties and explore the structure of residents' social networks.

A common criticism of rational choice approaches, especially those attempting to assess maximization of utility, is that any preference may be hypothesized as the cause of any social outcome. The problem of studying "self-interest properly understood" is that understanding influential forces may be puzzling. Participation in voluntary organizations means different things to different people and there are many types of organizations that individuals may support (Wuthnow, 1991).

Implications for Professional Practice

Trust is the solution to the problem of order, and people vary in their reaction to others and propensity to trust others. Through these modifications of rational choice theory, we are best able to understand self-interest. While civic culture is developed through shared cooperation and action (Almond and Verba, 1963), security presents a dilemma in that there is no universally shared understanding of the problem. In security, taking individual measures in and around the home leads to decreased support for other types of measures in the city, but not from neighborhood life. Reich (1991) noted that more affluent communities are collecting private funds to provide supplemental services to their areas, calling this phenomena the "secession of the successful."⁵² However, contributions to the MNA do not replace support for municipal security related tax increases.⁵³

⁵² McKenzie (1994) notes that in 1992 America had over 150,000 homeowner associations providing various services for over 32,000,000 people.

⁵³ The development of community organizations challenges the Tiebout hypothesis that people move around the metropolis on a constant search for the "optimal" combination of governmental services and taxes. The city is abandoned when people cannot afford to move. This dissertation asserts that affluent members are willing to support raising their own taxes if the government justifies the increased expenditures.

While civic engagement is often viewed as a dichotomous choice between self-interest and altruism, I suggest that civic engagement is created through trust in the good itself (technological trust), or trust in the agent delivering the good. Purposive action takes place when there is trust that the actors' needs are fulfilled, though needs and levels of trust among actors are variable. Trust is a property of a system and not just a personal attribute. Why would anybody own a gun at home and risk injury or accidents if they did not trust that it would protect them? Why would residents pay for alarm systems if they did not trust it would protect them? Gun owners trust that gun handlers will be responsible, just as consumers of alarm systems trust that the company they are dealing with is reliable.

Understanding collective behavior requires understanding actors' motives to cooperate (Williams, 1988). Rational choice is criticized, but motives can be generalized for network members possessing specific characteristics. Having these characteristics is not sufficient to understand security, but people sharing like characteristics are more likely to reside in similar geographic locations and hold similar beliefs.

Putnam (1993) suggests that building trust through repeated exchange leads to strong support for institutions.

These institutions aid in creating a "we" feeling that further legitimates and perpetuates the existence of the institution. Isolates lack trust and do not visualize the payoff of contribution to collective goods.

Gaining the citizens' trust may sound simple, but it is difficult to do. People with lower status are more likely to view the government as illegitimate. Through public relations campaigns, the institution requesting support already has that "foot in the door" which leads to greater success for exchange and cooperation (Good, 1988).

Residents of Baton Rouge differ in their capacity for trusting the government. When Patrick Esco and Chauncey Thomas were shot to death by local law enforcement personnel, these incidents reduced levels of trust by the citizenry. Poor areas lacking social and political capital rely on themselves to supply security, protecting themselves with weapons as portable security systems.

A few years ago, some cars displayed bumper stickers with the slogan "pay police like your life depends on it." This slogan attempts to exploit fear to gain support for police and does little to build trust between the citizens and the police department. I argue that this campaign did little to develop citizens' trust in their police that is essential to support for additional resources.

Peterson (1981) divided all public goods as being administered through **developmental** and **redistributive** policies. Developmental policies are based on competition with other communities and are focused on improving the entire area. These developmental policies help attract business to the area and improve the area's national standing in quality of life assessments. Redistributive policies redistribute resources from the wealthier to those of lesser means. Voters are likely to support an election if they view the issue as developmental, benefitting everyone, and not redistributive, in which the affluent pay most of the taxes and the less-affluent receive most of the benefit (Weaver and Parent, 1994; Button, 1992; Hahn and Kamieneki, 1987). I expected to find that residents perceiving the greatest amount of inequitable governmental service delivery will be most likely to oppose tax millages. Homogeneous white areas may possibly view municipal security as an issue in which some residents are paying high taxes for extra policing in high crime (or black) neighborhoods. The third tax referenda's appeal to lock up criminals and provide more jail space appeared to reach the white middle class voters of the Midtown area. There was a greater perceived benefit in creating more jail

space than raising officers' pay, even though the third referendum did provide money for employee raises.

The root of tax and governmental service equity is Louisiana's tax system. Sales taxes are paid by all and property taxes are paid primarily by business and partially by those owning property valued in excess of \$75,000. Opponents of high sales taxes claim that they are regressive, with the poor paying a disproportionate share of their income. Opponents of higher property taxes claim that business and the affluent bear too much of the taxation burden.⁵⁴ For property tax millages, an appeal must be made to more affluent residents of the city. Those responsible for property taxes must develop trust in the government by being convinced that they will receive benefits which outweigh the costs. Though residents in Midtown have joined together to pay dues, the MNA is no substitute for the criminal justice system. Neighborhood organizations do not threaten support for governmental programs.

For the less affluent, trust must be made through the value of the governmental service. The wealthier must be

⁵⁴ Gov. Earl Long popularized his description of the Louisiana electorate with the slogan "Don't tax you. Don't tax me. Tax that guy behind the tree."

sold on the idea that they will pay for and receive a fair share of the services.

A shortcoming of my argument is that trust is not concrete. Trust can only be operationalized in a situational context. Assessments of preferences and constraints are highly subjective (Hechter et al., 1990). However, I assert that social scientists must look in the direction of the value of goods and trust in the related system.

In neighborhoods, even a small percentage of committed residents can make an impact on neighborhood life. In politics, 50% plus one vote is a victory. While I do not explain the actions of every actor, I provide a direction which may reach many of the people.

This dissertation presents a methodological challenge. Assigning values to goods and measuring trust will not be an easy task, but I assert that this is the foundation to understanding the problem of security, and hence, one aspect of the problem of order.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Almond, Gabriel and Sidney Verba. 1963. The Civic Culture. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Almy, Timothy A. 1975. "Residential Location and Electoral Cohesion: The Pattern of Urban Political Conflict." American Political Science Review. 67: 914-23.
- Bish, Robert L. and Vincent Ostrom. 1979. Understanding Urban Government: Metropolitan Reform Reconsidered. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.
- Black, Earl and Merle Black. 1989. Politics and Society in the South. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Blau, Peter M. 1964. Exchange and Power in Social Life. New York: John Wiley.
- Blau, Peter M. 1977. Inequality and Heterogeneity. New York: Free Press.
- Blumer, Herbert. 1965. "The Future of the Color Line." in John McKinney and Edgar T. Thompson (eds) The South in Continuity and Change. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Bohrnstedt, G.W. and T.M. Carter. 1971. "Robustness in Regression Analysis." in H.L. Costner (ed.) Sociological Methodology. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Bursik, Robert J. and Harold G. Grasmick. 1993. Neighborhoods and Crime: The Dimensions of Effective Community Control. New York: Lexington Books.
- Burstein, Paul. 1976. "Social Networks and Voting: some Israeli data." Social Forces. 54: 833-847.
- Burt, Ronald S. 1987. "Social Contagion and Innovation, Cohesion versus Structural Equivalence." American Journal of Sociology 92:1287-1335.

- Button, James W. 1992. "A Sign of Generational Conflict: The Impact of Florida's Aging Voters on Local School and Tax Referenda." Social Science Quarterly. 73: 786-797.
- Campbell, Angus, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes. 1960. The American Voter. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
- Campbell, Karen E., Peter V. Marsden, and Jeanne S. Hurlbert. 1986. "Social Resources and Socioeconomic Status." Social Networks. 8:97-117.
- Carmines, Edward G. and Stimson. 1989. Issue Evolution. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Castells, Manuel. 1977. The Urban Question: A Marxist Approach. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- Castells, Manuel. 1983. The City and the Grassroots: A Cross-cultural theory of Urban Social Movements. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Coleman, James S. 1990a. Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University.
- Coleman, James S. 1990b. "The Emergence of Norms." ch.2 in Hechter, Michael, Karl-Dieter Opp, and Reinhard Wippler (eds). 1990. Social Institutions: Their Emergence, Maintenance and Effects. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
- Coleman, James S., Elihu Katz, and Greg Menzel. 1966. Medical Innovation: A Diffusion Study. New York: Bobbs Merrill.
- Converse, Phillip. 1964. "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics." in David Apter (ed.) Ideology and Discontent. New York: Free Press.
- Courant, Paul N., Edward M. Gramlich, and Daniel Rubinfeld. 1980. "Why Voters Support Tax Limitation Amendments: The Michigan Case." National Tax Journal. 33:1-20.
- Crenson, Matthew A. 1978. "Social Networks and Political Processes in Urban Neighborhoods." American Journal of Sociology. 22: 578-594.

- Crenson, Matthew A. 1983. Neighborhood Politics. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
- Davidson, Chandler. 1972. Biracial Politics. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Delmas, Judith C. and William B. Bankston. 1993. 'The Effect of Racial Prejudice on the Ownership of Firearms: A Test of the "Fear and Loathing" Hypothesis.' National Journal of Sociology. 7: 139-161.
- DeTocqueville, Alexis. 1956 {1835}. Democracy in America. Richard D. Heffner (ed.) New York: Mentor.
- DuBow, Fred, Edward McCabe, and Gail Kaplan. 1979. Reactions to Crime: A Critical Review of the Literature. Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice.
- Farah, Barbara G., Samuel H. Barnes, and Felix Heunk. 1979. "Political Dissatisfaction." In Samuel Barnes and Max Kaase (eds) Political Action. Beverly Hills: Sage.
- Ferraro, Kenneth F. and Randy LaGrange. 1987. "The Measurement of Fear of Crime." Sociological Inquiry. 57: 70-101.
- Festinger, Leon, Stanley Schacter, and Kurt Back. 1950. Social Pressures in Informal Groups. New York: Harper.
- Fischer, Claude S. 1982. To Dwell Among Friends. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Fischer, Claude S. 1984. The Urban Experience. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
- Garofalo, James and Maureen McLeod. 1989. "The Structure and Operations of Neighborhood Watch Programs in the United States." Crime and Delinquency. 35: 326-44.
- Goffman, Erving. 1971. Relations in Public. New York: Harper and Row.

- Good, David. 1988. "Individuals, Interpersonal Relations, and Trust." ch.3 in Diego Gambetta (ed) Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations. New York: Basil Blackwell. pp. 31-48.
- Guest, Avery M. and R.S. Oropesa. 1986. "Informal Social Ties and Political Activity in the Metropolis." Urban Affairs Quarterly. 21: 550-574.
- Gusfield, Joseph. 1963. Symbolic Crusade. Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press.
- Guterbock, Thomas M. 1980. Machine Politics in Transition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Granovetter, Mark S. 1973. "The Strength of Weak Ties." American Journal of Sociology. 78: 1360-1380.
- Granovetter, Mark S. 1982. "The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited." Ch.5 in Peter Marsden and Nan Lin (eds.) Social Structure and Network Analysis. Beverly Hills: Sage.
- Hahn, Harlan and Sheldon Kamieniecki. 1987. Referendum Voting: Social Status and Policy Preferences. New York: Greenwood Press.
- Hardin, Russell. 1992. "The Street-Level Epistemology of Trust." Politics & Society. 21: 505-529.
- Hatcher, Larry and Edward J. Stepanski. 1994. A Step by Step Approach to Using the SAS System for Univariate and Multivariate Statistics. Cary, N.C.: SAS Institute.
- Hechter, Michael. 1987. Principles of Group Solidarity. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Hechter, Michael, Karl-Dieter Opp, and Reinhard Wippler. 1990. Social Institutions. New York: Aldine De Gruyter.
- Heckathorn, Douglas. 1989. "Collective Action and the Second-Order Free Rider Problem." Rationality and Society. 1:78-100.
- Heider, Fritz. 1958. The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations. New York: John Wiley.

- Hindelang, Michael, Michael Gottfredson, and James Garofalo. 1978. Victims of Personal Crime. Cambridge, Mass: Ballinger.
- Hirschman, Albert O. 1970. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
- Homans, George C. 1950. The Human Group. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World.
- Homans, George C. 1961. Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms. New York: Harcourt Brace.
- Huber, Joan. 1990. "Macro-Micro Links in Gender Stratification." American Sociological Review. 55: 1-10.
- Hunter, Albert. 1975. "The Loss of Community: An Empirical Test Through Replication." American Sociological Review. 40: 537-52.
- Hunter, Albert. 1985. "Private, parochial, and public social orders: The problem of crime and incivility in urban communities." ch.14 in Gerald D. Suttles and Mayer N. Zald (eds.) The Challenge of Social Control: Citizenship and Institution Building in Modern Society. Norwood, N.J.: Ablex Publishing.
- Hunter, Albert and Terry L. Baumer. 1982. "Street Traffic, Social Integration, and Fear of Crime." Sociological Inquiry. 52: 122-131.
- Hurlbert, Jeanne S. and Alan C. Acock. 1990. "The Effects of Marital Status on the Form and Composition of Social Networks." Social Science Quarterly. 71: 163-74.
- Inglehart, Ronald. 1977. The Silent Revolution. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Jankowski, Richard. 1992. "Social Control and the Freerider Problem in Small and Large Groups." Paper presented at the 1992 Public Choice Society Meetings. March 19-21 New Orleans, Louisiana.
- Kasarda, John D. and Morris Janowitz. 1974. "Community Attachment in Mass Society." American Sociological Review. 39: 328-39.

- Keller, Suzanne. 1968. The Urban Neighborhood. New York: Random House.
- Kelling, George L., Tony Pate, Duane Dieckman, and Charles E. Brown. 1974. The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment: A Summary Report. Washington D.C.: Police Foundation.
- Key, V. O. Jr. 1949. Southern Politics. New York: Knopf.
- Kilburn, John C. Jr. 1992. "I'm So Happy to Have Educated Friends." Paper presented at the 1992 International Sunbelt Social Network Conference. February 12-15 Tampa, Florida.
- Kilburn, John C. Jr. 1996. "Network Effects in Caregiver to Care-Recipient Violence: A Study of Caregivers to Relations with Dementia." Journal of Elder Abuse and Neglect. In Press.
- Knoke, David and Randall Thomson. 1977. "Voluntary Association Membership Trends and the Family Life Cycle." Social Forces. 56: 48-65.
- LaGrange, Randy L. and Kenneth F. Ferraro. 1989. Assessing age and gender differences in perceived risk and fear of crime." Criminology. 27: 697-719.
- Lasswell, Harold and Abraham Kaplan. 1950. Power and Society. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Laumann, Edward O. 1969. "Friends of Urban Men: An Assessment of Accuracy in Reporting Their Socioeconomic Status, Mutual Choice, Attitude and Agreement." Sociometry. 32: 54-69.
- Laumann, Edward O. 1973. Bonds of Pluralism. New York: Wiley.
- Lavrakas, Paul J., Janice Normoyle, Wesley G. Skogan, Elicia J. Hertz, Greta Salem, and Dan A. Lewis. 1981. Factors Related to Citizen Involvement in Personal, Household, and Neighborhood Anti-Crime Measures. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office.
- Lazarsfeld, Paul, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet. 1948. The People's Choice. New York: Columbia University Press.

- Lewis, Dan A. Jane A. Grant, and Dennis Rosenbaum. 1988. The Social Construction of Reform: Crime Prevention and Community Organizations. New Brunswick: Transaction Books.
- Lewis, Dan A. and Greta Salem. 1986. Fear of Crime: Incivility and the Production of a Social Problem. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books.
- Lindsay, Betsy and Daniel McGillis. 1986. "Citywide Community Crime Prevention: An Assessment of the Seattle Program." In Dennis Rosenbaum (ed.) Community Crime Prevention: Does It Work? Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Liska, Allen E., Joseph J. Lawrence, and Andrew Sanchirico. 1982. "Fear of crime as a social fact." Social Forces 60: 760-770.
- Lo, Clarence Y. H. 1990. Small Property Versus Big Government: Social Origins of a Property Tax Revolt. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Lofland, Lyn H. 1973. A World of Strangers. New York: Basic Books.
- Logan, John R. and Molotch, Harvey L. 1987. Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Luhmann, Niklas. 1988. "Familiarity, Confidence, Trust: Problems and Alternatives." ch. 6 in Diego Gambetta (ed) Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations. New York: Basil Blackwell. pp. 94-107.
- Marsden, Peter V. 1987. "Core Discussion Networks of Americans." American Sociological Review. 52: 122-31.
- Maslow, Abraham. 1954. Motivation and Personality. New York: Harper & Row.
- Massey, Douglas and Nancy Denton. 1993. American Apartheid. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- McDowall, David and Colin Loftin. 1983. "Collective Security and the Demand for Legal Handguns." American Journal of Sociology 88:1146-61.

- McKenzie, Evan. 1994. Privatopia: Homeowner Associations and the Rise of Residential Private Government. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- McPherson, J. Miller. 1981. "A dynamic Model of Voluntary Affiliation." Social Forces. 59: 705-28.
- Miethe, Terance. 1991. "Citizen-Based Crime Control Activity and Victimization Risks: An Examination of Displacement and Free-Rider Effects." Criminology. 29: 419-439.
- Miller, Frederick D., Dennis Grega, Gregory Malia, and Sam Tsemberis. 1980. "Neighborhood Satisfaction among Urban Dwellers." Journal of Social Issues. (summer) 36: 101-117.
- Moore, Gwen. 1990. "Structural Determinants of Men's and Women's Personal Networks." American Sociological Review. 55: 726-35.
- Moore, Mark H. and Robert C. Trojanowicz. 1988. "Policing and the Fear of Crime." National Institute of Justice Perspectives in Policing report #3. Washington D.C.: National Institute of Justice.
- Newcomb, Theodore. 1961. The Acquaintance Process. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.
- Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Oropesa, R.S. 1989. "The Social and Political Foundations of Effective Neighborhood Improvement Organizations." Social Science Quarterly. 70: 723-743.
- Oskamp, Stuart, Maura J. Harrington, Todd C. Edwards, Deborah J. Sherwood, Shawn M. Okuda, and Deborah C. Swanson. 1991. "Factors Influencing Household Recycling Behavior." Environment and Behavior. 23: 494-519.
- Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

- Ostrom, Elinor and Roger B. Parks. 1973. "Suburban Police Departments: Too Many and too Small?" ch.14 in Louis Masotti and Jeffrey K. Hadden (eds.) The Urbanization of the Suburbs. vol.7, Urban Affairs Annual Reviews. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Ostrom, Elinor, William H. Baugh, Richard Guarasci, Roger B. Parks, and Gordon P. Whitaker. 1973. Community Organization and the Provision of Police Services. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Professional Paper in Administrative and Policy Studies 03-001.
- Peterson, Paul E. 1981. City Limits. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Podolefsky, Aaron and Frederic DuBow. 1981. Strategies for Community Crime Prevention: Collective Responses to Crime in Urban America. Springfield, Ill: Charles C. Thomas.
- Putnam, Robert. 1993. Making Democracy Work. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Putnam, Robert D. 1995. "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital." Journal of Democracy. 6: 65-78.
- Reich, Robert. 1991. "Secession of the Successful." New York Times Magazine. January 20, p. 42.
- Rich, Richard C. 1980. "Dynamics of Leadership in Neighborhood Organizations." Social Science Quarterly. 60: 570-587.
- Rich, Richard C. (ed) 1982a. Analyzing Urban Service Distributions. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books.
- Rich, Richard C. (ed) 1982b. The Politics of Urban Public Services. Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books.
- Rich, Richard C. and Abraham Wandersman. 1983. "Participation in Block Organizations." Social Policy. 14: 45-47.
- Rosenbaum, Dennis P. 1987. "The Theory and Research Behind Neighborhood Watch: Is it a Sound Fear and Crime Reduction Strategy." Crime and Delinquency. 33: 103-34.

- Sampson, Robert J. 1988. "Local Friendship Ties and Community Attachment in Mass Society: a multilevel systemic model." American Sociological Review.
- Shevky, Eshref and Wendell Bell. 1955. Social Area Analysis. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press.
- Skogan, Wesley G. 1977. "Public Policy and the Fear of Crime in Large American Cities." ch.1 in John A. Gardiner (ed.) Public Law and Public Policy. New York: Praeger. pp. 1-18.
- Skogan, Wesley G. 1990. Disorder and Decline. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Skogan, Wesley and Michael Maxfield. 1981. Coping With Crime: Individual and Neighborhood Reactions. Beverly Hills: Sage.
- Smith, Adam. 1981 {1786}. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. R.H. Campbell and A.S. Skinner (eds.) Indianapolis: Liberty Classics.
- Smith, Barton A. 1982. "Racial Composition as a Neighborhood Amenity." in Diamond and Tolley (eds) The Economics of Urban Amenities. New York: Academic Press 165-91.
- Smith, Douglas A. and C.D. Uchida. 1988. "The social organization of self-help: a study of defensive weapon ownership." American Sociological Review. 53: 94-102.
- Smith, Marguerite T. 1993. "Slashing Your Taxes on Your Home." Money. January, pp 97-100.
- Spaulding, Charles B. 1966. "Relative Attachment of Students to groups and organizations." Sociology and Social Research. 50: 421-35.
- Straits, Bruce. 1991. "Bringing Strong Ties Back In: Interpersonal Gateways to Public Information and Influence." The Public Opinion Quarterly. 55:432-48.
- Suttles, Gerald. 1968. The Social Order of the Slums. Chicago: U of Chicago Press.
- Suttles, Gerald. 1972. The Social Construction of Communities. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- Toennies, Ferdinand. 1957. Community and Society.
Translated and edited by Charles P. Loomis. East
Lansing: Michigan State University Press.
- Thibaut, J.W. and H.H. Kelley. 1959. The Social Psychology
of Groups. New York: John Wiley.
- Turner, Jonathan H. 1985. Herbert Spencer: A Renewed
Appreciation. Newbury Park: Sage.
- Updegrave, Walter L. 1994. "You're Safer Than You Think."
Money. June pp 114-124.
- Warr, Mark. 1984. "Fear of Victimization: Why Are Women and
the Elderly More Afraid?" Social Science
Quarterly. 65: 681-702.
- Warr, Mark. 1990. "Dangerous Situations: Social Context and
Fear of Victimization." Social Forces. 68: 891-
907.
- Warr, Mark. 1992. "Altruistic Fear of Victimization in
Households." Social Science Quarterly. 73: 723-
36.
- Warr, Mark and Mark Stafford. 1983. "Fear of Victimization:
A Look at the Proximate Causes." Social Forces.
61: 1033-1043.
- Weaver, Sue Wells and T. Wayne Parent. 1994. "Voter
Characteristics and Support for Local School Taxes:
Urban Politics and Policy in Elections in a Louisiana
Parish." Urban Education. 29: 150- 168.
- Wellman, Barry. 1979. "The Community Question: The Intimate
Networks of East Yorkers." American Journal of
Sociology. 84: 1201-1231.
- Wellman, Barry and N. Scot Wortley. 1990. "Different
Strokes for Different Folks." American Journal of
Sociology. 96: 553-588.
- Wellman, Barry and Stephen Berkowitz. 1988. Social
Structure: A Network Approach. Cambridge, U.K.:
Cambridge University Press.
- Williams, Bernard. 1988. "Formal Structures and Social
Reality." ch.1 in Diego Gambetta (ed) Trust. pp
3-13.

- Wilson, James Q. and Edward Banfield. 1964. "Public Regardingness as a Value Premise in Voting Behavior." American Political Science Review. 58: 876-887.
- Wirth, Louis. 1938. "Urbanism as a Way of Life." American Journal of Sociology. 44: 1-24.
- Wright, James D., Peter H. Rossi, and Kathleen Daly. 1983. Under the Gun: Weapons, Crime, and Violence in America. New York: Aldine.
- Wuthnow, Robert. 1991. Acts of Compassion. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

APPENDIX A

Table A.1

Screened Eligible Responses

Listed in 1991			
Directory			
	No	Yes	Total
Complete	41	96	137
	70.70%	72.20%	71.70%
Refusal	17	37	54
	29.30%	37.80%	28.30%
	58	133	191

Table A.2

All Inhabited Houses

Listed in 1991			
Directory			
	No	Yes	Total
Complete	41	96	137
	50.00%	51.90%	51.30%
Refusal	17	37	54
	20.70%	20.00%	20.20%
Did Not Contact	24	52	76
	29.30%	28.10%	28.50%
	82	185	267

SAMPLE DESCRIPTION

One hundred thirty-seven surveys were completed for this study. A total of 282 confirmed addresses in the area were sent letters of introduction and approached to be surveyed. In the process, 15 houses (5.3%) were confirmed to be vacant. Of the 267 inhabited households, 137 (51.3%) completed the survey, 46 (17.2%) directly refused our interviewer, 8 (3.0%) broke two or more appointments to be interviewed, 21 (7.9%) homes were believed to have someone inside but did not open their door, and 55 (20.6%) were not contacted in at least four attempts.⁵⁵

Of the entire survey sample, 90 homes were not listed as eligible for membership in the Midtown Neighborhood Association. Eight (8.9%) of these were vacant. Of the 82 inhabited households not eligible for membership in the Midtown Neighborhood Association, 41 (50%) completed the survey, 14 (17.1%) directly refused our interviewer, 3 (3.7%) broke two or more appointments to be interviewed, 8 (9.8%) homes were believed to have someone inside but did

⁵⁵ In order to increase response rates and ensure interviewer safety, interviewers did not attempt to interview at night.

not open their door, and 16 (19.5%) were not contacted in at least four attempts.

One hundred and ninety-two homes in the sample were eligible for membership in the Midtown Neighborhood Association. Seven (3.6%) of these homes were vacant. Of the 185 inhabited households eligible for membership in the Midtown Neighborhood Association, 96 (51.9%) completed the survey, 32 (17.3%) directly refused our interviewer, 5 (2.7%) broke two or more appointments to be interviewed, 13 (7.0%) were believed to have someone inside but did not open the door, and 39 (21.1%) were not contacted in at least four attempts.

Table A.3

1990 U.S. Census characteristics of block group which contains Midtown neighborhood

Population - 740
 white population - 732
 black population - 0
 other population - 8
 number of households - 331
 median year housing structure was built - 1952
 white female headed households with children - 1.8%
 white female headed households with no children - 4.2%
 median household income (for 1989) - \$ 36,544
 per capita income (for 1989) - \$ 18,014
 white per capita income - \$ 18,014
 black per capita income - 0
 public assistance per household - 0
 whites over age 25 with HS diploma (includes GED) - 518
 white individuals living in poverty - 6

APPENDIX B

Table A.4
History of Baton Rouge Tax Elections

			Pass-Failed
April 1987	17 mills	Sewerage improvements	f
May 1987	2 mills	Park operations	p
May 1987	5 mills	School operations	p
May 1987	6 mills	School employee raise	p
May 1987	.5 mills	Anti-drug program	p
Nov 1987	Indefinite	Sewerage improvement	f
April 1988	1/2 cent sales	Sewerage improvement	p
May 1990	1/2 cent	Street repairs	p
Jan 1992	7 mills	Sheriff's office operation	f
April 1992	10 mills	School operations	f
April 1992	8 mills	School employee raises	f
April 1992	2 mills	School books	f
April 1992	.25 mills	I Care (anti-drug)	p
July 1992	14 mills	police/fire operation	f
Oct. 1993	7.5 mills	police/prison	p

APPENDIX C

Table A.5
Comparison of City Police Dispatches for 1990 and 1993

	Baton Rouge		District 2A	
	1990	1993	1990	1993
Burglary	9,798	9,242	876	946
Shootings or shots fired	1,778	3,242	152	293
Stabbings	357	281	36	30
Armed Robberies	533	1,094	50	80

Table A.6
Police Dispatches by Subdistrict, May 1992 - May 1993

(Midtown is centrally located in this area making up about half of the geography.)

Zone 2A-3

Burglary	257
Armed Robbery	46
Assault	74
Stabbing	2
Shootings or Shots fired	79

Table A.7
Zero-Order Correlation Table of Protective Measures

		X_1								
Installed Alarm	X_1	1.000	X_2							
Install Dead Bolts	X_2	.249''	1.000	X_3						
Purchase a Dog for Protection	X_3	-.040	.010	1.000	X_4					
Installed Security Fences	X_4	-.029	.138	.219'	1.000	X_5				
Leave TV, Radio, Lights On	X_5	-.034	.075	-.028	-.120	1.000	X_6			
Purchased Weapons for Protection	X_6	.035	.251''	.251''	.055	.117	1.000	X_7		
Installed Window Locks	X_7	.051	.402''	.012	.099	-.113	.112	1.000	X_8	
Installed Outdoor Lighting	X_8	.203'	.569''	.167	.173'	-.073	.151	.278''	1.000	

APPENDIX D

MIDTOWN COMMUNITY STUDY

INTERVIEW MAIN OWNER/RENTER OR SPOUSE. USING PENCIL, CIRCLE NUMBER OR ENTER CORRECT ANSWER. CIRCLE "MISSING" IF DON'T KNOW, NO RESPONSE, CAN'T SAY.

Midtown 1 (1)
 ID (3-6)
 Interviewer Name: (8-9)
 STREET ADDRESS (11-16)
 ADDRESSEE (18-21)

Dates/Time of attempted contact?
 First Try
 Second
 Third
 Fourth

Date of Interview: 19 (23-24)
 (date) (month) (year) (26-27)
 (29-30)

Reason for non-interview:

1. no one home in 4 calls
2. someone seems to be at home, but no one answers the door
3. direct refusal.
4. Indirect refusal. Always too busy, two or more broken appointments
5. Respondent does not speak English
6. Dwelling was vacant--no one living there. (32)

Introduction

Hello--I'm a student at LSU in the Department of Sociology. We're doing a neighborhood study of the Midtown area. Are you the man/woman of the house? ((If yes, continue; If no, ask to speak to him/her))

Did you get our letter about this? ((IF YES..continue; IF NO..give copy of letter first)).

As the letter says we're interested in the quality of people's lives and the quality of life in their communities. You can call the Department at LSU (388-1645) to confirm my identity, or you can ask the other students who are interviewing other people up and down the street right now.

I'll be asking you about life in this neighborhood and the kinds of things you do to protect yourself and your family. This is a volunteer study being conducted by students. It's not an ordinary survey. It's more interesting because it's not just about you but about the people you know, and about topics such as crime. As that letter explained, I would like to ask some questions of a member of your household. The interview should take about 20 minutes.

First, in order to figure out who is eligible for this interview, I need to get an idea of who lives here.

1. The name we had from the phone book was (ADDRESSEE). Is that correct?

1.Yes 2.No ____ (34)

2. So you are ? (WRITE NAME) _____
(ask IF NECESSARY)

3. How many adults live here? _____ (36)

4. How many children live here? _____ (38)

5. How many of these children are under 12? _____ (40)

Who to interview?

IF BOTH MAN & WOMAN ARE PRESENT, TALK TO THE PERSON WHO SPENDS THE MOST TIME AT HOME. IF ONE IS RELUCTANT, INTERVIEW THE OTHER. IF THE PERSON YOU'RE TALKING TO IS NOT THE MAIN MAN/WOMAN OF THE HOUSE, DO NOT COMPLETE THE INTERVIEW. THANK HIM/HER AND ASK FOR A GOOD TIME TO RETURN.

6. In what year did you first begin living in this home? 19
 _____ (42-43)

7. Did you grow up in (Circle all that apply)
 Louisiana? Y N _____ (45)
 Baton Rouge? Y N _____ (47)
 this neighborhood? Y N _____ (49)
 this house/apt? Y N _____ (51)

8. How long have you lived in (enter years)
 _____ Louisiana _____ (53-54)
 _____ Baton Rouge _____ (56-57)
 _____ this neighborhood _____ (59-60)
 _____ this house/apt _____ (62-63)

THE NEIGHBORHOOD

"These first questions are about the neighborhood."

9. Some people feel that their neighborhood is a real home to them, while others think of it as just a place where they happen to be living. Which one of those comes closest to the way you consider this neighborhood, a real home or just a place to live.

1. real home 2. just a place to live (9.missing) _____ (65)

10. How likely is it that you might move out of this neighborhood within the next couple of years?

1.definitely 2.probably 3.probably won't 4.definitely won't
 (9.missing) _____ (67)

11. Supposing that for some reason you had to move away from the Midtown area, how sorry would you be to leave?

1. Very sorry 2. Somewhat sorry 3. Not too sorry
 4. Not at all sorry (9. missing) _____ (69)

12. How often do the following things happen around here?

HAND RESPONDENT CARD "A" with responses: 1.often 2. sometimes
 3. rarely 4. never. (Circle 9 if missing.)

a) You hear loud noises from the street when you're inside _____ (71)
 1 2 3 4 9

b) People walk down this street that aren't from around here _____ (73)
 1 2 3 4 9

c) Neighbors play music too loud, have late parties, or quarrels _____ (75)
 1 2 3 4 9

d) People leave litter or trash around the area _____ (77)
 1 2 3 4 9

e) People don't take care of their property or lawn _____ (79)
 1 2 3 4 9

f) Purse snatching, robbery, or other street crimes _____ (1)
 1 2 3 4 9

((RESPONSES ARE: 1. Often 2. Sometimes 3. Rarely 4. Never
(9.missing))

- g) Gunshots 1 2 3 4 9 ____ (3)
- h) You see drug dealers or users on the street 1 2 3 4 9 ____ (5)
- i) You see homeless people 1 2 3 4 9 ____ (7)
- j) Families let their children get out of control 1 2 3 4 9 ____ (9)
- k) People are loud or disorderly 1 2 3 4 9 ____ (11)
- l) You personally have hassles or conflicts with people living in the area 1 2 3 4 9 ____ (13)

13. Do you have any worries about safety when you see young kids--I mean kids under 12--playing outside around here?

1. Yes 2. No (9.missing) ____ (15)

14. Thinking of the Midtown area as a whole, how many of the people who live around here can be trusted?

1. almost all 2. most can 3. about half ____ (17)
4. most can't 5. almost no one (9.missing)

15. How many neighbors do you know by name? By neighbors I mean anyone up and down the block.

1.all 2.nearly all 3.most 4.about half
5.some 6.not many 7.none (9.missing) ____ (19)

16. How many neighbors do you know by sight?

1.all 2.nearly all 3.most 4.about half
5.some 6.not many 7.none (9.missing) ____ (21)

17. Thinking about your adult friends that you have now, how many of them would you say live in this neighborhood?

1. nearly all 2. most 3. a few 4. none
(9. missing) ____ (23)

18. How often do you do the following things in this neighborhood?

HAND CARD "A" TO RESPONDENT with responses: 1. often 2. sometimes
3. rarely 4. never (9. missing)

a) you borrow something small from neighbors ____ (25)

1 2 3 4 9

b) your neighbors borrow something small from you ____ (27)

1 2 3 4 9

c) you greet or talk to people you don't know very well ____ (29)

1 2 3 4 9

d) you visit with neighbors informally at home ____ (31)

1 2 3 4 9

((RESPONSES ARE: 1. Often 2. Sometimes 3. Rarely 4. Never
(9.missing))

e) you have picnics, parties, or bar-b-que's with neighbors ____ (33)
1 2 3 4 9

19. Taking all your adult relatives and in-laws, except the very distant ones, how many of them live in this neighborhood?
1.nearly all 2.most 3.a few 4.none
(9. missing) ____ (35)

20. Thinking about the people that live around here, do you sometimes wish there were more people in the neighborhood you could talk or get together with; or do you feel OK about the way things are?
1. more people 2.O.K. (9.missing) ____ (37)

21. What about having people you can rely on to look after your house and your things when you're out or away. Do you sometimes wish you knew more people like that; or do you feel OK about the way things are?
1. more people 2.O.K. (9.missing) ____ (39)

22. Overall, during the past two years, would you say that your neighborhood has become a better place to live, has gotten worse, or is about the same as it used to be?
1.better 2.same 3.worse (9.missing) ____ (41)

23. All things considered, what do you think the neighborhood will be like two years from now? Will it be a better place to live, will it have gotten worse, or will it be about the same as it is now?
1.better 2.same 3.worse (9.missing) ____ (43)

PERSONAL RELATIONS

In this next section, I'd like to ask you just five questions about some of the specific people you know, at least close enough to call by name. I need the full name. We're not concerned with who the people are, but we have to keep track and often people have the same or similar names. We put this information into the computer by numbers and we destroy the names themselves to insure your confidentiality. No one will ever see the names themselves.

Interviewer Instructions: Get the full name as far as R knows it. If R OBJECTS OR HESITATES: These are just standard survey items; we destroy the actual names and use numbers so no one can be identified. I'm just asking for names in order to keep things straight. All this information is just converted into numbers and we don't keep the names once we do that. We're trying to find out whether people know people in the neighborhood or outside it. TRY TWICE FOR FULL NAMES: IF R continues to refuse, ask for first names only.

Important: WRITE DOWN THE NAMES ON THE LEFT ON THE MATRIX and MAKE A CHECK IN THE COLUMN FOR ALL QUESTIONS WHERE THE NAME IS GIVEN. But if R has already given you the name, check the column for that question and don't write it down again.

NAME QUESTIONS

(1) From time to time, people discuss important matters with other people. Looking back over the last six months - who are the people with whom you discussed matters important to you?
(Write down each name and make a check mark in column 1. If less than 5 names mentioned, probe anyone else? Only record first five names.)

1A) Are any of these people relatives?
(make check mark in column 1a)

1B) Do any of these people live in the Midtown area?
(check column 1b)

(2) Just counting the adults, who are the people that normally live in this household? Just give me their first & last names.
By adult I mean 16 and over. ((make check mark in column 2))

(3) Not including the people who live here, what adult relatives do you or your husband/wife have in the Midtown area.
Just give me their first & last names.
((make check mark in column 3))

(4) Are there any people in the Midtown area that you would consider friends or close personal acquaintances? What are their names?

((make check mark in column 4))

((IF R asks about "friends", say use your own definition!))

(5) How about in the Baton Rouge area (but outside the Midtown area). Are there any you would consider friends or close personal acquaintances? What are their names?

((make check mark in column 5))

In answer to these last questions, you gave me the names of some of the people you know. Now I'd like to get a little more information about them.

Interviewer: WRITE JUST THE FIRST NAMES IN BLOCK LETTERS ON SEPARATE SHEET HAND the list of first names TO R.

Make CHECK MARKS ON THE MATRIX WHILE R. LOOKS AT THE LIST OF FIRST NAMES.

a & b) Please tell me the Sex and Race of the people on the list.

((IF ASKED WHY WE WANT TO KNOW, explain that we want to find out whether people know others with a different sex or background than themselves.))

c) Which of the people on this list do you feel especially close to? Just give me the first names of the people.

d) Not counting the people who live here, is there anyone on the list you have dropped in on for a chat during the past few months, or anyone who has dropped by on you for a casual visit? Just give me the first names.

e) Not counting the people who live here, is there anyone on the list you have invited over to your home during the past few months, or anyone who has invited you over to their home? Again, just the first names.

f) Not counting the people who live here, which people on this list do you ask to take care of your home when you're gone? For example, to watch the house, water plants, pick up the mail, or feed a pet, that type of thing.

g) How about anyone who asks you to take care of theirs?

h) How long have you known (NAME OF PERSON) in years?

ASK FOR EACH NAME: If "all my life", code 95.

SECURITY

Now I'd like to ask some questions about safety, security, and local affairs.

24. Would you say you follow what's going on in local government and public affairs? 1. most of the time 2. some of the time
3. only now and then 4. hardly at all (9. missing) ____ (45)

25. Have you ever written or spoken to your metro council representative or some other local leader? 1. Yes 2. No
(9. missing) ____ (47)

26. Have you ever written a letter to the editor of the local newspaper?
1. Yes 2. No (9. missing) ____ (49)

27. Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, Independent or what? ____ (51)
1. Republican 2. Democrat 3. Independent 4. other
(9. missing)

28. We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. If extremely liberal is point 1 and extremely conservative is point 7, where would you place yourself? ____ (53)

29. How much of the time would you say you trust the local government?
1. most of the time 2. some of the time 3. almost never
(9. missing) ____ (55)

30. Are you registered to vote? 1. Yes 2. No (9. missing) ____ (57)
(IF NO, skip to question #37)

31. Did you vote in the tax election for the sheriffs department this past October 16th? 1. yes 2. no 3. don't remember
(9. missing) ____ (59)

32. IF YES: How did you vote? 1. in favor 2. against
3. did not vote 4. don't remember (9. missing) ____ (61)

If you remember, last year both the sheriff's department (Jan. 1992) and the city police department (July 1992) had elections that would have raised property taxes in order to provide more funding.

33. Did you vote in the sheriff's tax election in January of 1992?
1. Yes 2. No (9. missing) ____ (63)

34. IF YES: How did you vote?
1. for 2. against 3. don't remember (9. missing) ____ (65)

35. Did you vote in the police department's tax election in July, 1992?
1. Yes 2. No (9. missing) ____ (67)

36. IF YES: How did you vote?
1. for 2. against 3. don't remember (9. missing) ____ (69)

37. Whether or not you registered or voted, do you support increased revenues to local law enforcement agencies?

1. Support strongly 2. Support somewhat
3. oppose somewhat 4. oppose strongly (9.missing) ____ (71)

38. In this area, is there any kind of local group, such as a homeowners' association, a block club, or any other sort of neighborhood organization?

- 1.Yes 2.No 3.don't know (9.missing) ____ (73)

39. What groups? (record names as respondent knows them, use back of sheet if necessary--PROBE: Anything else?) _____

40. Have you ever been a member of the Midtown Association?

(IF NO, SKIP TO QUESTION #43) 1.Yes 2.No (9.missing) ____ (75)

41. If YES, have you ever contributed money to this program?

- 1.Yes 2.No (9.missing) ____ (77)

42. If YES, do you currently contribute money to this program?

- 1.Yes 2.No (9.missing) ____ (79)

43. On a scale of 1 to 10 with 1 being totally ineffective and 10 being extremely effective, how effective is this program? ____

____ (1)

98. Haven't heard of the program 99. missing

44. Does this neighborhood have a neighborhood watch program?

(IF NO, SKIP TO QUESTION #45) 1.Yes 2.No (9.missing) ____ (3)

b. IF YES, do you participate in it? 1.Yes 2.No (9.missing) ____ (5)

45. On a scale of 1 to 10 with 1 being totally ineffective and 10 being extremely effective, how effective is this program? ____

____ (7)

98. Haven't heard of the program 99. missing

46. Many people have taken steps to protect themselves and their property from crime and criminals. Have you taken (or requested) any of the following steps? (circle all that apply) These apply to you and your family, not to things already on the home when you came here.

- | | | | | |
|--|---|---|---|-----------|
| a) INSTALLED AN ALARM SYSTEM | Y | N | 9 | ____ (9) |
| b) INSTALLED DEAD BOLTS | Y | N | 9 | ____ (11) |
| c) INSTALLED DOOR CHAINS | Y | N | 9 | ____ (13) |
| d) INSTALLED SECURITY FENCES | Y | N | 9 | ____ (15) |
| e) INSTALLED WINDOW LOCKS OR GRATES | Y | N | 9 | ____ (17) |
| f) PURCHASED WEAPONS | Y | N | 9 | ____ (19) |
| g) PURCHASED A DOG FOR PROTECTION | Y | N | 9 | ____ (21) |
| h) AVOIDED GOING OUT ALONE | Y | N | 9 | ____ (23) |
| i) AVOIDED GOING OUT AT NIGHT | Y | N | 9 | ____ (25) |
| j) AVOIDED CERTAIN PLACES IN THE CITY | Y | N | 9 | ____ (27) |
| k) JOINED A COMMUNITY CRIME WATCH PROGRAM | Y | N | 9 | ____ (29) |
| l) CARRIED A WEAPON OUTSIDE THE HOME | Y | N | 9 | ____ (31) |
| m) REFUSED TO ANSWER THE DOOR | Y | N | 9 | ____ (33) |
| n) INSTALLED OUTDOOR LIGHTING | Y | N | 9 | ____ (35) |
| o) LEAVE LIGHTS/RADIO/TV ON WHEN YOU'RE GONE | Y | N | 9 | ____ (37) |
| p) OTHER (please specify _____) | Y | N | 9 | ____ (39) |

47. Do you now personally own a gun of any kind? 1.Yes 2.No
 (9.missing) ____ (41)
48. IF YES, did you acquire the gun for hunting, protection, both, or something else? 1. Hunting 2. Protection
 3. both 4. other (9.missing) ____ (43)
49. Have you ever been threatened with a gun, or shot at?
 1.Yes 2.No (9.missing) ____ (45)
50. In general, do you feel that the laws covering the sale of handguns should be made more strict, less strict, or kept the same as they are now.
 1.more strict 2.the same 3.less strict (9.missing) ____ (47)

CRIME

HAND RESPONDENT CARD "B" WITH RESPONSES 1. very safe 2. fairly safe
 3. not very safe 4. not safe at all (9. missing)

51. As far as crime is concerned, how safe do you feel personally?
 1.very safe 2.fairly safe 3.not very safe 4.not safe at all
 (9.missing) ____ (49)
52. Again, as far as crime is concerned, how safe do you feel this household is? 1. very safe 2. fairly safe 3. not very safe
 4. not safe at all (9.missing) ____ (51)
53. Now about this neighborhood. How safe do you feel it is?
 1.very safe 2. fairly safe 3. not very safe 4. not safe at all
 (9.missing) ____ (53)
54. How about the safety of Baton Rouge in general?
 1. very safe 2. fairly safe 3. not very safe 4. not safe at all
 (9.missing) ____ (55)
55. Is there any area right around here--that is, within a mile--where you would be afraid to walk alone at night?
 1.Yes 2.No (9.missing) ____ (57)
56. Thinking about the neighborhoods in Baton Rouge, are there any you go out of your way to avoid driving through?
 1.Yes 2.No (9.missing) ____ (59)
57. There's been a lot of talk about the murder rate in Baton Rouge this year? I'm going read a few things that might be responsible and ask your opinion:

HAND RESPONDENT CARD "C" WITH RESPONSES: 1. agree strongly
 2. agree somewhat 3. disagree somewhat 4. disagree strongly

Homicide rates are high because:

- a) There's a lot of poverty and misery in some areas of Baton Rouge.
 1 2 3 4 9 ____ (61)
- b) Drug dealers are killing each other.
 1 2 3 4 9 ____ (63)
- c) Innocent bystanders are being shot in drug wars.
 1 2 3 4 9 ____ (65)

- d) Violence within the home is increasing. 1 2 3 4 9 ____ (67)
- e) Guns are so easy to get hold of. 1 2 3 4 9 ____ (69)
- f) Most victims of murder in Baton Rouge are involved in drugs or crime. 1 2 3 4 9 ____ (71)
- g) Gambling will cause crime to increase. 1 2 3 4 9 ____ (73)
- h) If someone assaulted me, I could protect myself. 1 2 3 4 9 ____ (75)
- i) Even in my home, I'm not safe from people who want to take what I have. 1 2 3 4 9 ____ (77)
- j) I would be afraid if someone knocked on my door after dark and I wasn't expecting anyone. 1 2 3 4 9 ____ (1)
- k) The courts in this area deal too harshly with criminals. 1 2 3 4 9 ____ (3)
- l) The courts in this area are harder on blacks than they are on whites. 1 2 3 4 9 ____ (5)
- m) Crime is the most important issue facing us right now. 1 2 3 4 9 ____ (7)
- n) There is too much coverage of crime in the media right now. 1 2 3 4 9 ____ (9)
- o) I'm more afraid of violence than I am of getting things stolen. 1 2 3 4 9 ____ (11)
- p) Gun ownership by ordinary people helps to prevent crime. 1 2 3 4 9 ____ (13)
- q) If guns are outlawed, only criminals will have guns. 1 2 3 4 9 ____ (15)
- r) Accidental deaths by guns are quite frequent. 1 2 3 4 9 ____ (17)

58. There is a certain amount of crime in any neighborhood. What's your feeling about **who's responsible** for the crime around here? Is it most likely:

1. people who live here (that is, in this neighborhood)
2. people from other neighborhoods in Baton Rouge
3. people who aren't from Baton Rouge
- (9. missing) ____ (19)

59. Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder? 1.favor death penalty 2.oppose death penalty (9.missing) ____ (21)

60. Has a crime been committed against any of your property during the past two years? 1.Yes 2.No (9.missing) ____ (23)

61. Have you been the victim of a violent crime (that is, against your person) during the past two years? 1.Yes 2.No (9.missing) ____ (25)

62. IF YES, did you report this crime to the police? 1.Yes 2.No (9.missing) ____ (27)

63. Not including you, has anyone in this household been a victim of crime in the past two years? 1.Yes 2.No (9.missing) ____ (29)

64. How many other people do you know in this neighborhood that have been crime victims in the past two years?

1. many 2. a few 3. none (9.missing) ____ (31)

65. Have you heard of Operation Takedown?

1.Yes 2.No (9.missing) ____ (33)

66. How often do you see the police in this neighborhood (not including private security patrols)?

1. often 2. some 3. almost never (9.missing) ____ (35)

67. Do you think the police pay more or less attention to this neighborhood than Baton Rouge as a whole?

1. more 2. same 3. less (9.missing) ____ (37)

HAND RESPONDENT CARD "C" WITH RESPONSES: 1. agree strongly
2. agree somewhat 3. disagree somewhat 4. disagree strongly

"These next questions are about the police and sheriff's office."

68. a) More money needs to be spent on law enforcement in order to reduce the incidence of crime. 1 2 3 4 9 ____ (39)

b) The police and deputies generally do a good job in Baton Rouge. ____ (41)

1 2 3 4 9

c) The police and deputies generally do a good job in this neighborhood.

1 2 3 4 9 ____ (43)

d) It would be better if the same police officers patrolled this neighborhood all the time and people knew who they were. ____ (45)

1 2 3 4 9

e) It would be better if the police were less involved in this neighborhood. ____ (47)

1 2 3 4 9

f) It would be better if the police were more involved in this neighborhood, even if it took them a little longer to respond to 911 calls. ____ (49)

1 2 3 4 9

g) The police are generally a nuisance around here. ____ (51)

1 2 3 4 9

h) The police act too aggressively toward the members of this community.

1 2 3 4 9 ____ (53)

i) The police need to do more to get the drug dealers off the streets.

1 2 3 4 9 ____ (55)

j) The police are too hard on blacks. ____ (57)

1 2 3 4 9

ATTITUDES

69. In most places there are differences or conflicts between people. In your opinion, how much conflict or tension is there between (XX) in BR?

- | | | |
|---------------------------------------|-------------|------|
| a. poor people and rich people | _____ | (59) |
| 1.lots 2.some 3.very little | (9.missing) | |
| b. How about blacks and whites? | _____ | (61) |
| 1.lots 2.some 3.very little | (9.missing) | |
| c. How about whites & Asians? | _____ | (63) |
| 1.lots 2.some 3.very little | (9.missing) | |
| d. How about blacks & Asians? | _____ | (65) |
| 1.lots 2.some 3.very little | (9.missing) | |

70. Would you be willing to pay a tax to provide the following services for Baton Rouge?

- | | | |
|-----------------------------------|----------|------------------------|
| 1. Yes | 2. No | (9.missing/don't know) |
| a) litter pick up and landscaping | Y N | 9 _____(67) |
| b) police patrols | Y N | 9 _____(69) |
| c) neighborhood schools | Y N | 9 _____(71) |
| d) extended day care | Y N | 9 _____(73) |

71. Would you be willing to pay a tax to provide the following services if the service was provided for the Midtown neighborhood area alone?

- | | | |
|-----------------------------------|----------|------------------------|
| 1. Yes | 2. No | (9.missing/don't know) |
| a) litter pick up and landscaping | Y N | 9 _____(75) |
| b) police patrols | Y N | 9 _____(77) |
| c) neighborhood schools | Y N | 9 _____(79) |
| d) extended day care | Y N | 9 _____(1) |

RACE

"Now I'd like to ask you some questions about relations between blacks and whites."

For each of the following tell me whether you 1. agree strongly 2. agree somewhat 3. disagree somewhat or 4. disagree strongly. (HAND RESPONDENT CARD "C")

72. a) The position of blacks has been improving in the past few years.

- | | | |
|--|-------------------------------|-------|
| 1 2 3 4 9 | _____ | (3) |
| b) Most people would prefer to live in neighborhoods with people of their same race. | 1 2 3 4 9 | _____ |
| c) The government should not make any special effort to help minorities. | | (5) |

- | | | |
|--------------------------------------|-------|-----|
| 1 2 3 4 9 | _____ | (7) |
| d) Most whites are afraid of blacks. | | (9) |

- | | | |
|--------------------------------------|-------|------|
| 1 2 3 4 9 | _____ | (11) |
| e) Most blacks are afraid of whites. | | |

- | | | |
|--|-------|------|
| 1 2 3 4 9 | _____ | (13) |
| f) Blacks have too little influence in the life and politics of Baton Rouge. | | |

g) People have the right to refuse to sell their property to anyone they choose, black or white. ____ (19)

1 2 3 4 9

73. Overall do you think that relations between blacks & whites in Baton Rouge for the past few years are:

1.improving 2.about the same 3.getting worse (9.missing) ____ (21)

74. Would you personally prefer to live in a neighborhood that is

1.all white 2.mostly white 3.about half white and half black
4.mostly black 5.all black (9.missing) ____ (23)

75. Do you think that more black families will move into this neighborhood in the next few years? 1.Yes 2.No

(9.missing) ____ (25)

BACKGROUND QUESTIONS

"Now, just a few background questions and we'll be done."

76. Are you 1. married 2. divorced 3. widowed 4. separated
5. single? (9.missing) ____ (27)

77. Last week were you 1. working full time 2. part time
3. going to school 4. keeping house 5. something else?
(9.missing) ____ (29)

78. If working, do you have more than one job?
1.Yes 2.No (9.missing) ____ (31)

79. About how much time do you spend at home during a typical weekday?
1.most of the morning 2.most of the afternoon 3.most of the day
4. not much of the day 5. none of the day (9.missing) ____ (33)

80. How about a typical weekend?
1.most of the morning 2.most of the afternoon 3.most of the day
4. not much of the day 5. none of the day (9.missing) ____ (35)

81. Is there usually someone around the house during the day?
1.Yes 2.No (9.missing) ____ (37)

82. What kind of work do/did you do? _____
PROBE: What is/was your job title.

IF RESPONDENT IS MARRIED:

83. What kind of work does your spouse do? _____

84. Which religious denomination do you most closely identify with?
1. Protestant 2. Catholic 3. Jewish 4. Other (9.missing) ____ (39)

85. About how often do you attend religious services--
1. almost every week 2.about once a month 3.once or twice a year
4.less often than that? (9.missing) ____ (41)

86. Do you consider yourself mainly:
1. Asian 2. Black 3. Hispanic 4. White
5. Other 8. Don't know (9.missing) ____ (43)

87. How many years of education did you receive? _____ (45-46)
 _____ (total years, including grades through HS and college)
88. How many years of education did your spouse receive? _____ (48-49)
 _____ (total years, including grades through HS and college)
89. How many of your children are in private school? _____ (51)
90. How many of your children are in public school? _____ (53)
91. What happens with your children are sick or on days when the kids don't have school and you are unable to be there?
 1. R. stays at home with children 2. spouse or partner stays with them
 3. relative 4. neighbor or non-relative 5. child stays home alone
 6. older brother or sister 7. organized day care program
 8. other (9.missing) _____ (55)
92. If you were asked to use one of five names for your social class, which would you say you belong in:
 1. the lower class 2. the working class 3. the middle class
 4. the upper middle class 5. the upper class? (9.missing) _____ (57)
93. So far as you and your family are concerned, would you say that you are
 1. pretty well satisfied with your present financial situation
 2. more or less satisfied 3. not satisfied at all? (9.missing) _____ (59)
94. Thinking about your life as a whole, how happy would you say you are these days-- 1.very happy 2.pretty happy 3.pretty unhappy
 4.very unhappy?
 (9.missing) _____ (61)
95. Have you ever had to rely on food stamps or government assistance to make ends meet? 1.Yes 2.No (9.missing) _____ (63)
96. Have others who live here ever had to rely on food stamps or government assistance to make ends meet?
 1.Yes 2.No (9.missing) _____ (65)
97. In what year were you born? 19____ (67)
98. (HAND CARD "D") Give me the number of the income group that includes your personal annual income before taxes. This figure includes all of your income--wages, salaries, interest, dividends, (child support), and all other incomes. IF UNCERTAIN: What would be your best guess? (CIRCLE THE NUMBER AND ENTER THE INCOME CODE BELOW)
1. under \$ 3,000 this year
 2. between \$ 3,001 and \$ 8,000
 3. between \$ 8,001 and \$ 12,000
 4. between \$ 12,001 and \$ 16,000
 5. between \$ 16,001 and \$ 20,000
 6. between \$ 20,001 and \$ 25,000
 7. between \$ 25,001 and \$ 30,000
 8. between \$ 30,001 and \$ 35,000
 9. between \$ 35,001 and \$ 45,000
 10. between \$ 45,000 and \$ 60,000
 11. more than \$ 60,000 _____ (69-70)
 99. missing

99. Please give me the number of the income group that includes your family/household income before taxes. This figure should include all income--wages, salaries, interest, dividends, (child support), and all other incomes. IF UNCERTAIN: What would be your best guess?

1. under \$ 3,000 this year
2. between \$ 3,001 and \$ 8,000
3. between \$ 8,001 and \$ 12,000
4. between \$ 12,001 and \$ 16,000
5. between \$ 16,001 and \$ 20,000
6. between \$ 20,001 and \$ 25,000
7. between \$ 25,001 and \$ 30,000
8. between \$ 30,001 and \$ 35,000
9. between \$ 35,001 and \$ 45,000
10. between \$ 45,000 and \$ 60,000
11. over \$ 60,000

99. missing

____(72-73)

END OF INTERVIEW

THANK RESPONDENT MANY TIMES OVER

INTERVIEWER OBSERVATIONS

ANSWER THESE QUESTIONS YOURSELF AFTER THE INTERVIEW

100. Who did you talk to?
 1. Male head of household
 2. Female head of household _____(75)
101. Respondent's race as you would guess it
 1. White 2. Black 3. Asian 4. Hispanic 5. Other _____(77)
102. Did you see any of the following in the respondent's home or on its grounds? (CODE ALL THAT APPLY)
- | | | | |
|-----------------------------|---|---|------------|
| a) burglar protection signs | Y | N | _____ (79) |
| b) alarms | Y | N | _____ (1) |
| c) barking dogs | Y | N | _____ (3) |
| d) many locks on the door | Y | N | _____ (5) |
| e) chain-link fence | Y | N | _____ (7) |
| f) grills on doors, windows | Y | N | _____ (9) |
103. Did R have difficulty hearing the questions or understanding the questionnaire?
 1. Hearing 2. Understanding 3. Both 4. No problems _____(11)
104. What was the respondent's initial attitude about being interviewed?
 1. very interested 2. somewhat interested 3. indifferent
 4. somewhat reluctant 5. very reluctant 6. hard to tell _____(13)
105. What was the respondent's attitude about giving both first and last names during the interview?
 1. volunteered information easily 2. somewhat reluctant, but did not object 3. somewhat suspicious and objected at first, but then cooperated 4. refused to give full names 5. refused to give even first names 6. didn't refuse but I thought s/he held back _____(15)
106. Was anyone else present during the interview?
 1. Yes 2. No _____(17)
107. Did respondent speak with a foreign accent?
 1. Yes 2. No _____(19)
108. Did the respondent have any obvious physical disabilities or impairments, such as loss of limb, paralysis, facial disfigurement, serious speech problems, palsy, or the like?
 1. Yes 2. No _____(21)
109. Aside from what (he/she) said in answer to the specific questions, is it your impression that the respondent leads a very busy and active life; that (he/she) doesn't have much to do; or that (he/she) is about average.
 1. leads active life 2. leads average life 3. inactive _____(23)
110. How open and forthcoming do you think the respondent was about (his/her) feelings?
 1. very open 2. held back somewhat 3. held back a great deal _____(25)

111. Did you observe any signs of tension or stress in the respondent's behavior? 1.Yes 2.No ____ (27)
112. How well kept up is the outside of the respondent's house and yard/apartment building?
1. very attractive 2. well kept up 3. a bit worn down
4. very poorly kept up ____ (29)
113. How much activity--cars and/or people--was there on the street?
1. a great deal 2. some 3. almost none ____ (31)
114. Was this a ?
1. single-family detached home
2. duplex
3. 2-8 unit apartments
4. trailer ____ (33)
115. YARD (circle all that apply) ____ (35)
1 = presence of a beer can or liquor bottle
2 = other litter or trash on lawn
3 = grass uncut

VITA

John Collins Kilburn, Jr. was born in New Orleans, Louisiana, on December 22, 1964. He is married to Judith C. Delmas. He is the son of John C. Kilburn, Sr. and Barbara Kilburn, both of New Orleans, Louisiana. He attended St. Pius X elementary school and graduated from Jesuit High School in May, 1982. He graduated from the University of New Orleans in December, 1987 with a bachelor of arts degree in sociology.

Kilburn began his graduate training at Louisiana State University in August, 1989. He has worked on various research projects primarily under the supervision of Wesley Shrum. He received his master of arts degree in sociology in May, 1992. He has several publications in the areas of politics, family violence, and ritualistic behavior. His dissertation address security as a multi-level process with a unique set of determinants for each type of action. He expects to receive his doctor of philosophy degree in August of 1996. He is currently employed as an Adjunct Assistant Professor of Humanities at Our Lady of the Lake College.


DOCTORAL EXAMINATION AND DISSERTATION REPORT


Candidate: John C. Kilburn Jr.

Major Field: Sociology





Title of Dissertation: Security and Rational Choice: Household, Community,
and Public Provision

Approved:


Major Professor and Chairman


Dean of the Graduate School

EXAMINING COMMITTEE:

Date of Examination:

June 25, 1996